Ambiguity exists where a term is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation looking to the plain, ordinary meaning or popular sense of the word .

Cannon by and Through Cannon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 590 So.2d 191 (Ala. 1991).

Alaska2, 3, 4

Insurance contracts are to be construed so as to provide that coverage which a lay person would have reasonably expected from a lay interpretation of the policy terms. An ambiguity exists when the contract as a whole and the extrinsic evidence support differing reasonable interpretations.

Stordahl V. Government Employees Ins. Co., 564 P.2d. 63, 66 (Ak. 1977); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 757 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1985) (Applying Alaska Law); Serradell v. Hartford Acc. And Indem. Co., 843 P.2d 639 (Ak. 1992).

Arizona1, 2, 3, 4, 5

Doctrine of reasonable expectations applies. Ambiguity exists where language is unclear and can be reasonably construed in more than one sense; policy must be read as a whole using plain and ordinary language for all terms; policy clauses limiting benefits are strictly construed in favor of the insured. Arizona courts will not enforce even unambiguous boilerplate terms in standardized insurance contracts in a limited variety of situations:
1. Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be understood by the reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured.

Sparks V. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 6476 P.2d 1127, 1135 Cert.denied 459 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 490, 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (Az. 1982); Standardized Agreements and the Parole Evidence Rule: Defining and Applying the Expectations Principle 26 Ariz.L.Rev. 793, 834-35 (1984); Coconino County v. Fund Administrators Ass'n, Inc., 149 Az. 427, 719 P.2d 693 (Az. 1986).

2. Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of the term in question, and the provision is either unusual, or one that emasculates apparent coverage.

3. Where some activity which can be reasonably attributed to the insurer would create an objective impression of coverage in the mind of a reasonable insured.
4. Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has induced a particular insured reasonably to believe that he/she has coverage although such coverage is expressly and unambiguously denied by the policy.

Arkansas1, 2

An ambiguity exists, however, only when a provision is susceptible to one or more reasonable interpretations. If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the policy's meaning and it is fairly susceptible of two interpretations, one favorable to the insured and the other favorable to the insurer the former will be adopted.

Norton v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 902 F.2d 1355 (8th Cir. 1990) (Applying Arkansas Law);Arkansas Farm Bureau Ins. Fed. v. Ryman, 309 Ar,. 283, 831 S.W.2d 133 (1992); Keller v. Safeco Ins. Co., 317 Ark. 308, 877 S.W.2d. 90 (Ar. 1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Midgett, 892 S.W.2d 469 (Ar. 1995).

California1, 2, 3, 5

Ambiguity exists, 4-part rule: 1) look to plain meaning of terms; 2) interpret the language in context, with regard to its intended function in the policy, attempting to be consistent with the insured's objectively reasonable expectations; 3) if neither 1 or 2 resolves the ambiguity then it is resolved against the insured; 4) an insurance policy provision is ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions both of which are reasonable.

AIU Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 807, 274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d. 1253 (Cal. 1990); Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 833 P.2d 545, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d. 538 (Cal. 1992) ; Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815 (Cal.App. 1993);Bay Cities Paving & Grading Inc. v. Lawyer's Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal.4th 854, 2161 Cal.Rptr.2d 691, 855 P.2d 1263 (Cal. 1993).

Colorado1, 2, 3, 4

An insurance company has an obligation to write the critical portions of its policies in plain english and with such precision that a reasonable lay person can, by reading the policy, understand the coverage provided. Ambiguity exists if the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; policy must be evaluated as a whole using the generally accepted meaning of words.

Travelers Insurance Co. v. Geffries-eaves, Inc., 166 Colo. 220, 442 P.2d. 822 (1968); Union Ins. Co. v. Huntz, 883 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1994) ;Travelers Indem. Co. v. Howard Elec. Co., 879 P.2d 431 (Colo.App.1994).

Delaware2

When the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, Delaware applies ordinary principles of contract law . . . An ambiguity exists only when the language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations. An ambiguity does not exist merely because two conflicting interpretations may be suggested; the insured must proffer more than a "possible construction of the policy." Because ambiguity lurks in every word, sentence, and paragraph in the eyes of a skilled advocate, absent a showing that the term has acquired a special meaning, the question is not whether there is an ambiguity in the metaphysical sense, but whether the language has only one reasonable meaning when constructed, not in a hyper technical fashion, but in an ordinary common sense manner.

Cheseroni v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 402 A.2d 1215, 1217 (Del.Super. 1979) aff'd 410 A.2d 1015 (Del. 1980); Hallowell v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 443 A.2d 925 (Del. 1982); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. V. Kenner, 570 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del. 1990). New Castle County v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co., 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992).

District of Columbia2, 4

When confronted with an integrated insurance agreement which contains ambiguous terms, the court must examine and interpret the policy 'through the eyes of a reasonable purchaser' . . . in interpreting ambiguous provisions, there must be resort to parol evidence and an exploration of extrinsic circumstances . . . particularly significant is extrinsic evidence concerning the parties' negotiations prior to and contemporaneous with the formation of the agreement, as well as their course of conduct under the contract.

Old American Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 223 A.2d 334 (D.C.Ct. App. 1966);1901 Wyoming Avenue Cooperative Association v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 461, N. 9 (D.C.App. 1975); Intern Broth, Etc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 36 (D.C.App. 1978).

Ambiguity exists where language has more than one clear meaning when words are given the meaning which common speech imparts.

Florida2

Although an ambiguity is not invariably present when analysis is necessary to interpret a policy, when the terms make the contract subject to different reasonable interpretations, one of coverage and one of exclusion, as in this case, an ambiguity does exist.

Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Woodlief, 359 S.2d 833 (Fla.App.Dist. 1978); Ellsworth v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 508 So.2d 395 (Fla. Ct. App. 1987); Weldon v. All American Life Ins. Co., 605 So.2d 911 (Fla.App.Dist. 1992).

Ambiguity exists when more than one interpretation may be fairly given to a policy provision.

Georgia1, 2, 3

Ambiguity is duplicity, indistinctness, an uncertainty of meaning or expression. A word or phrase is ambiguous when it is of uncertain meaning and may be fairly understood in more ways than one. Further, words in a contract have their usual and common meaning.

Kusuma v. Metametrix, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 255, 381 S.E.2d 322 (Ga.Ct.App. 1989); Major v. Allstate Ins. Co., 207 Ga.App. 805, 429 S.E.2d 172 (Ga.App. 1993).

Hawaii2, 3, 4, 5

In the field of comprehensive general liability insurance, the supreme court has stated that insurance policies are to be construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of a layperson. Ambiguity exists only where the contract taken as a whole is reasonably subject to differing interpretation; only after ambiguity is found will the policy be construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.

Sturla, Inc. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 67 Haw. 203, 684 P.2d 690 (Haw. 1984);Lee v. Insurance Co. of North America, 7 Haw.App. 338, 762 P.2d 809 (Haw.App. 1988).

Idaho2, 4, 5

Where there is ambiguity, the test is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the language of the contract to mean. Ambiguity exists if a term is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation; meaning of terms is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would attribute; exclusionary provisions are strictly construed against the insurer.

Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 102 ,138, 142, 627 P.2d 317, 321 (Id. 1981); City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 750 (Id. 1994).

Illinois2, 3

While ambiguities in an insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured, the mere absence of a definition does not necessarily render a policy term ambiguous, nor is an ambiguity created simply because the parties disagree about the meaning of the policy language. All the provisions of an insurance policy should be read to interpret it and to determine whether an ambiguity exists. A provision in an insurance policy is ambiguous if, considering the policy as a whole, it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.

Dolan v. Welch, 123 Ill.App.3d 277, 78 Ill.Dec. 675, 462 N.E.2d 764 (Ill.App. 1984); De Los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Co., 135 Ill.2d 353, 142 Ill.Dec. 787, 553 N.E.2d 301) (Ill. 1990) A. Miller & Co. v. Cincinnati, 217 Ill.App.3d 572, 160 Ill.Dec. 560, 577 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 1991); Allstate Insurance Co. v. Gonzalez-loya, 226 Ill. App.3d 446, 968 Ill. Dec. 482, 589 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) .

Indiana1, 2

Under Indiana law, if an insurance policy exclusion is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous and must be given the meaning most favorable to the insured. However, clear and unambiguous policy language must be given its plain meaning.

Freeman v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 259 Ind. 237, 286 N.E.2d 396, 397 (Ind. 1972); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Miles, 730 F.Supp. 1462, 1465 (S.D.Ind. 1990) aff'd 930 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1991); American Family Mut. v. National Ins. Ass'n, 577 N.E.2d 969 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991); Allstate Insurance Company v. Brown, 16 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 1994).

Iowa1, 2, 3, 4, 5

When words are left undefined in a policy, we do not give them a technical meaning. Rather, we give them their ordinary meaning, one that a reasonable person would understand them to mean.

Farm & City Ins. v. Potter, 330 N.W.2d 263 (Iowa 1983); A.y. Mcdonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. Of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607 (Iowa 1991); AMICO Ins. Co. v. Rossman, 518 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1994).

Ambiguity exists if, after the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the policy, a genuine uncertainty exists as to which one of two or more meanings is the proper one; court may refer to the dictionary and the interpretation favoring the insured must be adopted.

Kansas1, 2, 3, 4, 5

If there is a genuine uncertainty as to meaning of terms in an insurance contract, the policy is ambiguous and will be construed to mean what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood them to mean.

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Old Hickory Ins. Co., 248 Kan. 657, 810 P.2d 283 (Kan. 1991); Levier v. Koppenheffer, 879 P.2d 40 (Kan.App. 1994); House v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 251 Kan 419, 837 P.2d. 391 (Kan. 1992).

Ambiguity exists if after application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument it is generally uncertain which of two or more meanings is the proper meaning.

Kentuck2, 4

Ambiguity exists where language is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning using plain language; two cardinal rules of Kentucky insurance law: 1) contracts are to be liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the insured's; 2) exceptions and exclusions should be strictly construed to make insurance effective; terms of an insurance policy are to be given their ordinary meanings as persons with ordinary and usual understanding would construe them, and the terms of an insurance policy are to be enforced as written.

National Insurance Underwriters v. Lexington Flying Club, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Ky.App. 1979); City of Louisville V. Mcdonald, 819 S.W.2d 319 (Ken. Ct. App. 1991); See also Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McKinley 831 S.W.2d 164 (Ken. 1992); Foster v. Kentucky Housing Corp., 850 F.Supp. 558 (5th Cir. 1994) (Applying Kentucky Law).

Louisiana1, 2, 3

When the language of an insurance policy and its endorsements are clear and unambiguous, a reasonable interpretation consistent with the obvious meaning and intent of the policy must be given.

Maggio v. Manchester Insurance Co,. 292 So.2d 644 (La.App. 1974); Duplantis V. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 606 So.2d 51 (La.App.992); Herbert v. Hartford Ins. Co. Of the Midwest, 649 So.2d 631 (La.Ct.App. 1994).

Ambiguity exists where language is susceptible to two or more equally reasonable interpretations; the meaning of a word is determined solely on its face without necessity of extrinsic evidence.

Maine1, 3, 4, 5

Contrary to the rule adopted in other jurisdictions, the rule in Maine is firmly embedded that a contract of insurance, like any other contract, is to be construed in accordance with the intention of the parties, which is to be ascertained, when there is ambiguity from an examination of the whole instrument. All parts and clauses, including exceptions and conditions, must be considered together in order to perceive if and how far one particular clause is explained, modified, limited or controlled by another clause. And, in applying these rules of construction to, and interpreting the meaning of, the instant insurance contract, the language used in the policy should be viewed from the standpoint of the average ordinary person who is untrained in either one law of the insurance field "in light of what a more casual reading of the policy would reveal to an ordinarily intelligent insured." The objectively reasonable expectations of an insured will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.

Baybutt Construction Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 455 A.2d 914 (Me. 1983); Brackett v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 486 A.2d 1188 (Me. 1985).

Maryland1, 4

Unless there is an indication that the parties intended to use words in the policy in a technical sense, we accord the words their usual, ordinary and accepted meaning. A words' ordinary signification is tested by what meaning a reasonably prudent lay person would attach to the term. In the event of ambiguity, courts may consider extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of policy language.

Pacific Idem. v. Interstate Fire & Cas., 302 Md. 383, 388, 488 A.2d 486 (Md. 1985); Mitchell v. Maryland Casualty; 324 Md.44, 56, 595 A.2d 469 (Md. 1992); Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 330 Md.758, 625 A.2d 1021 (Md. 1993); .Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md.App. 690, 647 A.2d 1297 (Md.Ct.Spec.App. 1994) .

Absent evidence that parties intended special or technical meaning, words in an insurance contract are accorded their usual, ordinary and accepted meaning; Maryland does not follow the rule that an insurance policy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer.

Massachusetts2, 5

When construing language in an insurance policy, we consider what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the relevant policy language, would expect to be covered.

Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 407 Mass. 689, 700, 555 N.E.2d 576 (Mass. 1990); Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mcfadden, 413 Mass. 90, 595 N.E.2d 762 (Mass. 1992); Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co. v. Office Unlimited, Inc., 419 Mass. 462, 645 N.E.2d 1165 (Mass. 1995).

Ambiguity exists in an insurance contract when language contained therein is susceptible to more than one meaning using plain and ordinary meaning.

Michigan2, 3, 4, 5

Where insurer fails to provide otherwise, the commonly understood meaning, which a typical lay person might reasonably expect to apply to policy term, must prevail.

Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, 205 Mich.App. 644, 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich.Ct.App. 1993); Michigan Mut. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 445 Mich. 558, 519 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. 1994).

Ambiguity exists if, after reading the entire contract as a whole, its language can reasonably be understood in different ways; exclusions in insurance policies are to be read with the insuring agreement and independent of other exclusions; exclusionary clauses are strictly construed against the insurer.

Minnesota1, 2, 3, 5

Ambiguity exists in an insurance contract if it is susceptible to more than one meaning or if there exists an irreconcilable conflict between its terms or provisions, after reading the entire contract; language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning; the reasonable expectations of the insured must be determined; insurer has the burden of proving a policy exclusion applies.

Canadian Universal Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kraayenbrink, 370 N.W.2d. 455 (Minn.App. 1985); Hubred v. Control Data Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. 1989).

Mississippi1, 2, 3

When the language is ambiguous, insurance policies are to be construed in a manner most favorable to the insured. Under Mississippi jurisprudence words, terms, phrases, and clauses in insurance contracts to be given their everyday meanings not hyper technical or esoteric definitions, but their plain and common meaning.

Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. V. Randle, 370 F.2d 68, 72 (5th Cir. 1966);Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 S.2d 797 (Miss. 1979); Employers Ins. Of Wausau v. Trotter Towing Corp., 834 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1988) (Applying Mississippi Law); Mcfarland V. Utica Fire Ins. Co. Of Onedja County Ny, 814 F.Supp. 518 (S.D.MISS. 1992) Aff'd 14 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 1992).

Ambiguity exists when a policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation after all provisions are construed, if possible, to give effect to each.

Missouri1, 2, 4, 5

In construing an insurance policy, the words must be given their plain meaning, consistent with the reasonable expectations, objectives and intent of the parties. The language of an insurance policy is ambiguous when it is reasonably and fairly open to different constructions. The words will be tested in light of the meaning which would normally be understood by the average lay person. The lay person's definition will be applied unless it plainly appears that the technical meaning is intended.

Canadian Universal Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Fire Watch, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 570, 572 (Minn. 1977); Standard Artificial Limb, Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 205 (Mo. 1989); Krombach v. Mayflower Ins. Co., Ltd., 785 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Mo.App. 1990) Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Safety Mut. Cas. Corp., 869 S.W.2d 145 (Mo.App. 1993).

Montana2, 3

Looking to the Kansas rule which we have adopted, we find that the test is not what the insurer intended the words of the policy to mean but what a reasonable person in the position of an insured would understand them to mean.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 187, 433 P.2d. 795, 798 (Mont. 1968); Alpha Real Estate Development, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Company, 570 P.2d 585 (Mont. 1977); Conal Ins. Co. v. Bunday, 249 Mont. 100, 813 P.2d 974 (Mont. 1991).

Ambiguity exists in an insurance contract only when the contract taken as a whole in its wording or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different interpretations; language is ambiguous when different persons looking at it in the light of its purpose cannot agree on its meaning.

Nebraska2, 5

An insurance policy should be interpreted in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured at the time of the contract. A contract of insurance should be given a reasonable construction so as to effectuate the purpose for which it was made. In cases of doubt, it is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured.

Modem Sounds & Systems Inc. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 200 Neb. 46, 49, 262 N.W.2d 183, 186 (1978); Decker v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 244 Neb. 281, 505 N.W.2d 719 (Neb. 1993); Union Ins. Co. v. Land and Sky, Inc., 247 Neb. 696, 529 N.W.2d 773 (Neb. 1995).

Ambiguity exists in an insurance contract when it can be fairly interpreted in more than one way, and the word, phrase or provision in question is susceptible to at least two conflicting meanings; the dictionary meaning of terms may be used.

Nevada1, 2, 3, 4

An insurance policy is to be judged from the perspective of one not trained in law or in insurance, with the terms of the contract viewed in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. A reading of the provision must include reference to the entire policy and must be read as a whole in order to give reasonable and harmonious meaning to the entire policy.

Transamerica Ins. Group v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 492 F.Supp. 283 (D. Nev. 1980) (Applying Nevada Law); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Reno's Executive Air, 100 Nev.360 364, 682 P.2d 1380, 1392 (Nev. 1984); Siggelkow v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 109 Nev. 42, 846 P.2d 303 (Nev. 1993).

Ambiguity exists if the court determines language is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning by plain language; exclusionary clauses are strictly construed against the insurer.

New Hampshire1, 2, 3

Courts look to the plain and ordinary meaning of words in their context and construe terms of the policy as would a reasonable person in the position of the insured based on more than a casual reading of the policy as a whole.

Concord General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 138 N.H. 229, 637 A.2d 903 (N.H. 1994);High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474 (N.H. 1994); Niedzielski v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 141, 146, 589 A.2d 130, 133 (N.H. 1991).

Ambiguity exists that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer if the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage.

New Jersey1, 4, 5

Insurance contracts are to be construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the average policyholder. In the absence of a specific definition in an insurance policy, the words must be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary, plain and usual meaning. Ambiguity exists if the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage; at this point the courts can resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

Killeen Trucking Inc. v. Great American Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 211 N.J.Super. 712, 715, 716, 512 A.2d 490 (App.Div. 1986); Daus v. Marble, 207 N.J.Super. 241, 636 A.2d 1091 (N.J.Super. A.D. 1994); Nunn v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., 274 N.J.Super. 543, 644 A.2d 1111 (N.J. 1994).

Rhode Island1, 5

The Terms should be given their plain, ordinary and usual meaning. If there remains any doubt, the terms should be read in the same sense that the insurer had reason to believe would be the way they would be interpreted by the ordinary reader and purchaser. The test to be applied is not what the insurer intended by the words, but what the ordinary reader and purchaser would have understood them to mean.

Elliott Leases Cars Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.i. 721, 326 373 A.2d 810, 812 (R.I. 1977); Hughes v. American Universal Ins. Co., 423 A.2d 1171 (R.I. 1981); Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757 (R.I. 1990).

South Carolina2, 3, 4

In the absence of a prescribed definition in the policy, the term should be defined according to the ordinary and usual understanding of the term's significance to the ordinary person. Ambiguity exists when language used is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning when the contract is read as a whole giving words used their plain, ordinary meaning; exclusions are strictly construed against the insurer.

Green v. United Ins. Co. of America, 254 S.C. 202, 174 S.E.2d 400 (1970); Mcpherson v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 412 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 1991); USAA Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rowland, 435 S.E.2d 879 (S.C.App. 1993).

Tennessee1, 2, 3

In determining whether the meaning of a contract is clear or ambiguous courts apply the following principles. The language in dispute must be examined in the context of the entire agreement. Words must be given their usual and ordinary interpretation. The language of a contract is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and when it can be fairly construed in more than one way. Insurance policies almost always being written by the insurance company, are strictly construed in favor of the insured.

Cockle County Bd. Of Highway Commrs. v. Newport Utilities Bd., 690 S.W.2d 231, 237 (Tenn. 1985); Moss v. Golden Rule Life Insurance Co., 724 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1986) ; Gredig v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 909 Tenn.App. 1994).

Texas1, 2, 3, 4

What controls is not the interpretation of individual words which are not defined in the policy itself, but the interpretation, which the ordinary person would give to the phrase as a whole, taken in the context of the whole policy. Ambiguity exists where language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; contract language is given its ordinary and generally accepted meaning; insurer must be reasonable in the amounts it gives to parties to settle claims when multiple claims have been filed and there is only a limited amount of insurance.

Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 584 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1979); Freeman v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 1979) reh.den.;Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Uribe, 595 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 1980) reh.den.; Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. v. Mcfarland, 887 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1994) reh.overruled; Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994)

Washington2, 4

The language of the policy is to be interpreted in accordance with the way it would be understood by the average person, rather than in a technical sense. An ambiguity exists in an insured contract if the language is fairly susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations. 3-part process: 1) ambiguity exists if language is fairly susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations interpreted as understood by the average person rather than in a technical sense; 2) if ambiguity exists, then the court may attempt to determine the parties intent by examining extrinsic evidence; 3) if the policy remains ambiguous after the application of extrinsic evidence the court will apply the rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are construed against the insurer; the rule strictly construing ambiguities in favor of the insured applies with added force to exclusionary clauses which seek to limit policy coverage.

Weyerhauser Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 123 Wash.2d 891, 874 P.,2d 142 (Wash. 1994); Santos v. Sinclair, 76 Wash. App. 320, 884 P.2d 941 (Wash.Ct. App. 1994).

Wyoming1, 2, 3, 5

This court utilizes a standard of interpretation for insurance policies which declares that the words used are given the plain meaning that a reasonable person, in the position of the insured, understands them to mean. Ambiguity exists when language is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation using the plain meaning of words so that a reasonable person, in the position of the insured understands them; contract read as a whole; extrinsic evidence may not be admitted to contradict plain meaning.

Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 806 (Wyo. 1979); Doctors Co. v. Ins. Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1993).