State & Local News Vol. 21, No. 3, Spring 1998 Supreme Court Watch Beate Bloch is a legal writing consultant in Washington, D.C. By Beate Bloch In the first part of the October 1997 Term, the Court invalidated portions of Louisiana's election law and New York's tax law. The Court denied absolute immunity to a prosecutor for statements of fact in an affidavit executed in support of a warrant. The Court also decided a dispute between South Dakota and an Indian tribe, and considered the extent of "full faith and credit" due a state court judgment in another state. Elections In Foster v. Love, 66 U.S.L.W. 4015 (decided Dec. 2, 1997), the Court turned its attention to a rarely considered clause of the Constitution. Louisiana law provided for an "open" primary election for Congress and Senate seats, to be held in October. If a candidate received a majority of the votesCwhich happened about 80 percent of the timeChe or she was declared elected. The Court held unanimously that the law conflicted with 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7, which establish the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the date for federal congressional elections. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, noted that the Election Clause, Article I, section 4, clause 1, gives Congress "comprehensive authority . . . to regulate the details of elections." Accordingly, "a contested selection of candidates for a congressional office that is concluded as a matter of law before the federal election day, with no act in law or in fact to take place on the date chosen by Congress, clearly violates § 7." Privileges and Immunities In Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 66 U.S.L.W. 4080 (decided Jan. 21, 1998), the Court ruled, 6 to 3, that the Privileges and Immunities Clause was violated by a provision of New York tax law that allowed only residents to deduct alimony payments from their income. Nonresidents must pay tax on their net income from New York real property or tangible personal property, and net income from employment or business, trade, or professional operations in New York. The tax is determined by taking into consideration the relationship between New York source income and the taxpayer's total income as reported to the federal government. Before 1987, nonresidents could take a pro rata deduction for alimony, under a decision of the New York Court of Appeals. The Tax Reform and Reduction Act of 1987 overruled that decision. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court noted that, under Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920), and Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920), states may "limit nonresidents' deductions of business expenses and nonbusiness deductions based on the relationship between those expenses and in-state property or income. Travis and Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), however, "make clear that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prohibits a State from denying non-residents a general tax exemption provided to residents." Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, pointed out that alimony payments are "a personal expense," which stem "entirely from the marital relationship" and "are principally connected to the State of residence." In this case, the payments, made by one Connecticut resident to another Connecticut resident, "cannot be said to take place in New York, nor do they inure to New York's benefit." Official Immunity In Kalina v. Fletcher, 66 U.S.L.W. 4031 (decided Dec. 10, 1997), petitioner, a deputy prosecuting attorney for King County, Washington, had filed (1) an information charging respondent with burglary, (2) a motion for an arrest warrant, and (3) a sworn "Certification for Determination of Probable Cause," summarizing the evidence supporting the charge. An arrest warrant was issued on the basis of the certification, which contained two inaccurate statements: (1) that petitioner was associated with the school that was burglarized (he had installed partitions and was authorized to enter the school); and (2) that he had been identified by employees of an electronics store. Respondent was arrested and spent one day in jail; the charges were later dismissed. Respondent brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure. Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, held that petitioner could not claim absolute immunity from suit. Her activities in connection with the preparation and filing of the information and the motion for an arrest warrant were protected. "The critical question" was "whether she was acting as a complaining witness rather than a lawyer when she executed the certification." It was not necessary for the prosecutor to make the certification. "Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer." Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Justice Thomas. Indians In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 66 U.S.L.W. 4093 (decided Jan. 26, 1998), the Court held, unanimously, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, that because Congress had "diminished" the Yankton Sioux Reservation by an 1894 Act, the unallotted tracts no longer constitute Indian country. Thus, the state had primary jurisdiction over the waste site in dispute, as well as other lands ceded under the Act. Full Faith and Credit Baker v. General Motors Corp. , 66 U.S.L.W. 4060 (decided Jan. 13, 1998), concerned the extraterritorial effect of a consent injunction entered by a Michigan county court as part of the settlement of a suit brought by a former employee, Elwell, against General Motors (GM). Elwell had been permanently enjoined from testifying as a witness in any litigation involving GM unless ordered to do so by a court. Subsequently, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify in a product liability suit in Missouri, which was removed to federal court by GM. The district court permitted Baker to depose Elwell. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the $11.3 million judgment recovered by Baker on the ground that Elwell's testimony should not have been allowed. The Supreme Court reversed, without dissent. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, ruled that the Michigan judgment could not "reach beyond the Elwell-GM controversy and control proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties, asserting claims the merit of which Michigan has not considered." Michigan "lacks authority" to preclude courts elsewhere, "in actions brought by strangers to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth." The opinion noted that a clause in the consent decree provided that it was not to "interfere" with the jurisdiction of the Georgia court in another pending action. Justice Scalia, concurring, thought that the Missouri court was not obliged to enforce the Michigan injunction. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, thought there was no collateral estoppel under Michigan law and that the Bakers were not bound by the judgment. State & Local Law News home page | Table of Contents