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New FCC May Bring New Approach
To Technology Issues
- William B. Baker
By the time this is published, four appointees of the new Administration
will hold office at the Federal Communications Commission. One,
new Chairman Michael Powell, served as a commissioner appointed
by former President Clinton until his designation as chairman by
President Bush. Mr. Powell has served as acting chairman since January.
Three other commissioners, Kathleen Abernathy and Kevin
Martin (both Republicans) and Democrat Michael Copps, are new.
Democratic Commissioner Gloria Tristani will likely depart
the Commission by year-end.
Chairman Powell assumes office with several years of experience
as a sitting commissioner. Two of the new commissioners, Ms. Abernathy
and Mr. Martin, previously served in staff positions at the FCC
and have remained active in the area. Mr. Martin also led the Bush
Administration's FCC transition team. Mr. Copps worked on Capitol
Hill for Sen. Hollings (D-SC), ranking Democrat on the Senate Commerce
Committee that oversees the FCC. As a group of Washington insiders
familiar with communications issues, they will get up to speed quickly.
Although Mr. Powell has a generally deregulatory record as a commissioner,
the position of chairman carries greater power, as in his new role
he will be able to set the agency's agenda and to direct the activities
of its many bureaus. As a result, Mr. Powell's views on technological
issues, particularly those relating to the Internet, should be of
particular interest to technology and communications lawyers.
Mr. Powell's public remarks as a sitting commissioner (including
since being tapped as chairman) evidence a thoughtful understanding
of new communications systems such as the Internet and of the FCC's
role in regulating the communications infrastructure that underlies
the Internet. Indeed, Mr. Powell has stated that the public policy
question is not "whether to regulate the Internet or not, as if
that were a realistic choice" - federal, state, local, foreign,
and international legislative proposals to do just that arise everyday
- but rather is "how to regulate it responsibly in a manner that
maximizes consumer welfare and does not stunt its infinite growth
and innovation potential." As he has noted, the FCC historically
has regulated the underlying infrastructure - the "rails" - on which
the Internet rides.
Mr. Powell has a deep interest in encouraging innovation. He frequently
sprinkles his remarks with quotations from economist Joseph Schumpeter
regarding the "creative destruction" of technological change. Mr.
Powell sees the broadband digital migration - the convergence of
communications with the computer that produces new broadband systems
having far more capabilities that previous analog communications
systems - fiber optics, DSL, and digital wireless networks - in
that light. From his public statements, as well as his recent record
as a sitting commissioner, it is reasonable to expect that Mr. Powell
will look askance at regulations that seem to deter innovation in
broadband digital services. In particular, expect the Powell Commission
to look kindly upon innovations that promise to spur additional
competition to current processes.
Second, expect the Powell Commission to chart a more deregulatory
course than his predecessors. Mr. Powell is much more likely than
his predecessors to refrain from regulatory interventions, and he
has remarked that deregulation is not a "dessert" awarded for good
conduct but rather is a fundamental approach to governing. In particular,
the Powell Commission is likely to manifest a deep skepticism about
"speculative fear and uncertainty in this innovation-driven space"
and a reluctance to conclude prematurely that a market failure is
imminent.
At the same time, Mr. Powell believes strongly in enforcing the
rules of the game. To this end, he has called for the power to impose
stiffer sanctions for violations of the local telephone competition
provisions of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 1996, believing
that the sanctions authorized by current law are too small.
Third, Mr. Powell appears much less activist than his predecessors.
Rather than launching new regulatory initiatives in the public interest,
Mr. Powell appears much more inclined to defer to Congress's definition
of the public interest in a given matter. Accordingly, do not expect
the Powell Commission to seek new requirements such as obligating
broadcasters to give free airtime to political candidates. Similarly,
the Powell Commission is unlikely to achieve regulatory objectives
by attaching "voluntary" conditions to mergers (witness the extensive
"voluntary" conditions imposed on the recent SBC/Ameritech and America
Online/Time Warner transactions), particularly in the absence of
any clear grant of regulatory authority.
Fourth, Mr. Powell's views on the need for the FCC to respond more
quickly to the pressures of convergence and the speed of Internet
time already have led him to commence a serious review of the agency's
structure. The FCC is organized in bureaus whose names illustrate
their legacy approach to regulation: Mass Media Bureau, Common Carrier
Bureau, Wireless Bureau, International Bureau, Enforcement Bureau.
Each bureau, in turn, applies legacy regulatory schemes. As a result,
converging technologies operate under differing regulatory regimes.
Today, how a service is regulated depends upon which bureau does
so. For example, telephone companies chafe under the obligation
to open their networks to virtually all comers, while high-speed
cable access services generally have no such duty. Incumbent and
competitive local exchange carriers operate under different regulatory
requirements, and telephone companies are regulated differently
depending upon whether they handle local or long distance traffic.
In public remarks, Mr. Powell has indicated a willingness to consider
a fresh approach and a sensitivity to the potentially adverse consequences
of asymmetric regulatory schemes to competition and emerging markets.
He has called for making FCC regulation more rational and greater
use of the agency's power to forbear from unnecessary regulations.
Perhaps as important, he also has called for the agency to act more
quickly in order to better respond to the challenges of Internet
time.
By the time this appears in print, the Powell Commission will have
several months under its belt and should have begun to make its
mark. Inevitably, it will be the tough cases that test the new chairman's
commitment to swifter agency action, to deregulating and rationalizing
the agency's rules, and to separating the true threats to competitive
markets from the speculative ones. Technology and communications
lawyers will, of course, be paying close heed.
Jurisprudent Therapy and
the Role of Mental Health Science in Federal Sentencing
In September, the Section cosponsored a presentation at the Federal
Bar Association Annual Convention in Cleveland, on "Mental Health
and Scientific Evidence." A substantial focus of this presentation
involved the role of mental health science in federal sentencing.
During the past two years, the Behavioral Sciences Committee has
focused on a "Jurisprudent Therapy" model for analyzing issues in
law and mental health. This perspective evaluates mental health
science, mental health practice, and mental health roles in terms
of their "jurisprudent" or "antijurisprudent" effects on those utilizing
behavioral science expertise.
Ever since the promulgation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
(28 U.S.C. §994 et seq.), scientific mental health evidence has
played a critical role in determining the proper assignation of
punishment, within the context of the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"). This role is most clearly apparent in the determination
of "downward departures" (Howard, 2001).
According to §5K2.13 of the Guidelines, a departure "may be warranted
if the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly
reduced mental capacity," although three exceptions may attach.
These involve:
- the significantly reduced mental state was caused by the voluntary
use of drugs or other intoxicants;
- the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate
a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual
violence or a serious threat of violence; and
- the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate
the defendant to protect the public.
In addition, §5K2.13 notes that "if a departure is warranted, the
extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced
mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense."
Professor Mark Howard of the Franklin Pierce Law Center provided
a compelling overview of qualifying mental health diagnoses during
our co-sponsored September presentation (reprised at the second
International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Cincinnati
in May). Noting that the §5K2.13 definition of "significantly reduced
mental capacity" involves "significantly impaired ability to (A)
understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense
or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that
the defendant knows is wrongful," Professor Howard identified the
following diagnoses as having qualified in various federal district
and circuit courts: major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder,
bipolar (manic depressive) disorder, schizophrenia, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder.
It is here that a jurisprudent therapy analysis attaches. If mental
health experts are not apprised of those diagnoses that "qualify"
in a particular jurisdiction for downward departure consideration,
their opinions may be of little use to the parties retaining them
(or to the court in which such evidence is proffered). In fact,
as Professor Howard has identified, several diagnoses and conditions,
although offered as qualified, have been determined insufficient.
These include spousal abuse, low self-esteem, borderline intellectual
functioning, suicidal tendencies, compulsive gambling, and AIDS
or HIV-positive status.
Attorneys retaining scientific mental health experts in this context
are advised to provide not only an overview of cases pertaining
to applications of the Guidelines, but also an up-do-date review
of credentialing and disclosure issues, as these typically evolve
more quickly than comparable state jurisdiction requirements (Drogin,
2000). Section members with an interest in the role of mental health
evidence in legal contexts are encouraged to contact the Behavioral
Science Committee.
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