Heckerling
Institute 2005
Reports from the event, as
posted to the ABA-PTL List Serve |
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Errata: Report 7, which covers the HIPAA session that was presented
by Michael Graham Esq. on Tuesday afternoon, mistakenly spelled
HIPAA as HIPPA. The error was occasioned in part by the humor of
the title of the presentation and in part by some of the Institute's
CLE materials that were available in the Registration area, where
the same spelling error appears. We apologize to Michael for our
not catching this before the Report went out.
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This Report contains coverage of the Wednesday Fundamentals session
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Income Taxation of Trusts, Estates, Grantors, and Beneficiaries
Presenter: Prof Jeffrey N. Pennell
Reporter: Connie T. Eyster Esq.
Professor Pennell began his presentation by stating that it is
his understanding that the IRS simply is not enforcing subchapter
J of Chapter 1 of the IRC and they are not training their agents
to be aware of the audit issues for 1041 returns. This also means,
however, that there is little authority to answer questions you
might raise.
Generally, it is no longer desirable to retain income in a fiduciary
vehicle. Grantor trust rules were designed to punish taxpayers by
forcing them to realize income that taxpayers were trying to bury
in a fiduciary vehicle. Now the rules give exactly the opposite
result.
Taxpayers now are taking advantage of the grantor trust rules to
achieve a lower income tax bracket or to make a tax-free gift by
absorbing a trust's income tax obligation and passing greater amounts
on to the beneficiary.
With regard to simple versus complex trusts, Professor Pennell
says that knowing the distinction is of very little value. The simple
trust rules in subpart B of subchapter J are really just the reader's
digest version of the complex trust rules. You can ignore subpart
B because everything that applies is the same as exists in subpart
C - except in one tiny circumstance that will be discussed later
in the outline.
Distributable Net Income (DNI) is taxable income that is computed
very much in the same way as it is computed for individuals. The
fundamental rule is (see p.6 of the materials) that fiduciary entities
are NOT pass-through entities the way you think of an S-corp or
partnership. They are conduit entities. Distributions carry-out
to the beneficiary DNI to the extent that distributions are made.
The entity gets a deduction for the amount of DNI that is carried
out.
The deduction is for the taxable portion of the DNI. To the extent
of the entities' deduction, the beneficiary has inclusion. To the
extent DNI is not carried out, it is taxable to the entity. That
is what is expensive. These rules apply to garden variety trusts
and to estates, which are always taxed complex trusts.
Subchapter E of Chapter 1 of the IRC deals with the grantor trust
rules. To the extent that those rules apply, they trump the subchapter
J rules just described.
Note (pg. 8-9 of the materials) that not every entity that you
think of as being a trust or estate is subject to subchapter J.
For instance an UTMA account is not subject to these rules because
the income is already taxable to the ward without the need for these
special rules.
Page 10 of the materials contains the definition of a simple trust.
Although generally not useful to know, a simple trust is required
to distribute all income annually and does not provide for charitable
distributions or set asides, and even then it is a simple trust
only for years in which the trustee also does not distribute corpus.
For the purpose of subchapter J, income means fiduciary accounting
income. This will depend on state law definitions of fiduciary accounting
income, which may embrace unitrust legislation and principle and
income allocations.
A complex trust is not a simple trust i.e., one that can
accumulate income and/or a trust from which the trustee has made
a distribution of corpus. Note that some trusts may be simple in
one year and complex in another.
On page 13, Pennell suggests some reasons why a fiduciary may want
to accumulate rather than distribute income, even though it may
be taxed at a much higher rate. These reasons generally relate to
the beneficiary, who may, for instance, prefer that the trust pay
the tax rather than distributing income outright, where it might
be subject to estate tax treatment in the beneficiaries estate.
Beginning on page 18 there are paragraphs describing how taxable
income is determined differently for taxable entities as opposed
to individuals. For instance, there is no standard deduction under
subchapter J, but rather there is a deduction in lieu of the personal
exemption which is $600 for estates and $300 or $100 for trusts
depending on whether there are mandatory or discretionary distributions
of income. Note that the deduction in lieu of the personal exemption
is solely for the benefit of the fiduciary if there is a tiny
amount of income that doesn't get distributed in the prior year,
then the fiduciary can avoid the hassle of filing a return in that
second year.
Other differences are that the 3% threshold on certain itemized
deductions does not apply to fiduciary entities under §68.
Under §67(e), the 2% loss of miscellaneous itemized deductions
does not apply to fiduciary entities to the extent that the administrative
expenses are unique to the fact that the assets are held by a fiduciary
entity as opposed to an individual. The materials discuss case law
in which this rule has been construed in particular with regard
to fees paid to investment advisors. Some courts would say that
such fees are unique and are not subject to the 2% rule, (see O'Neill
Irrevocable Trust v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 227 (1992)) while others would
say that they are not unique (see Mellon Bank v. United States,
2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) and Scott v. United States, 186 F. Supp.
2d
664 (E.D. Va. 2002)).
Note, Professor Pennell is troubled about the extent to which §
67 applies and believes this is the kind of thing the government
will focus on if it decides to start getting up to speed on these
returns.
As a practical matter, smartest thing to do is to adopt a position
and be consistent. Don't waffle and go back and forth one year to
the next.
There are elaborate rules dealing with adjustments to determine
the DNI, which are found starting on page 26 of the materials. Starting
with our typical notion of taxable income for an individual
the first adjustment is to add back the amount of the deduction
in lieu of the personal exemption to calculate DNI. Then, add back
any tax exempt income, which is included in order to allow DNI to
work properly with other ancillary income tax rules such at §265.
Tax exempt income carries out to the beneficiary with the same character
so it is never actually taxed. Also, ignore the distributions deduction
which is necessary to avoid circularity. The distributions
deduction is limited to the taxable portion of the DNI which would
make things difficult if the DNI were equal to taxable income after
allowance of the distributions deduction.
Further adjustments exist with regard to capital gains. To the
extent capital gain is allocated to corpus, it gets excluded from
DNI.
Here is that special rule for simple trusts that Professor Pennell
thinks is the one reason you might want to know the difference between
a simple and a complex trust. If there is a stock-on-stock dividend
issued that is allocated to corpus under the instrument or local
law and is not distributed to the beneficiary, it is excluded from
DNI.
Finally, electing small business trust income is not included in
DNI because it will be taxed to the trust under special rules specific
for that kind of trust.
The issue of when capital gain is included in DNI is a difficult
and complicated issue, which begins on page 29 of the materials.
The general rule is that capital gains of a trust are NOT includible
in DNI, except in the year of termination or to the extent that
capital
gains is part of what is distributed in a current year. Capital
gains will be included in DNI to the extent provided by regulation,
which establishes a bifurcated rule: (a) if gain is allocated to
income pursuant to a mandate that is provided by both state law
and the terms of the document, or (b) if gain is allocated to income
pursuant to fiduciary discretion, that is permissible under either
state law or the terms of the document, and the allocation is done
in a reasonable and impartial manner.
Pages 32.1 and 32.2 contain added elaboration on what is a "reasonable
and impartial manner." Professor Pennell again emphasized the
notion that you must be consistent in how you treat capital gains.
Once you've done it one way, you are cast in stone, which may not
have been what Congress intended, but is the posture the IRS currently
takes.
Professor Pennell did note that a special rule applies for complex
trusts where there is an accumulation of income (doesn't apply to
simple trust because a simple trust is not permitted to accumulate
income), which allows a trustee or an executor to make income distributions
in the first 65 days of the new year, which distributions will be
considered as having been made in the prior tax year. (See page
41 of the materials)
Page 42 of the materials begins a discussion of the Tier rule,
which governs how DNI is carried out depending on whether distributions
of income or corpus are made to the beneficiaries. Note that DNI
carries out regardless of the character of the property distributed,
but it does so in tiers.
Take the example where there are two beneficiaries who are both
required to receive equal amounts of income (each receiving $25K
of income in this example) and the DNI is $40K. Beneficiary 1 also
receives a discretionary distribution of corpus of $50K. Each beneficiary
still receives ½ of the DNI, despite the additional distribution
of corpus to beneficiary 1. Both beneficiaries are first tier beneficiaries
of 50% of the DNI because that is what the trustee was mandated
to distribute to them out of current income. Other amounts properly
paid (i.e., amounts other than income required to be
distributed) are not taxable unless there is undistributed net income
subject to old throwback rules.
Professor Pennell emphasized that in this area people need to pay
attention to the separate share rule, which is a rule that has been
ignored for a long time. This rule is used to prevent fiduciaries
from manipulating the timing of distributions to achieve favorable
tax results. When the separate share rule applies, substantially
independent and separately administered shares of a single trust
or an
estate will be treated as separate for DNI allocation. This assures
that the accumulation of DNI in one share will not affect the other
shares. As stated on page 47, the separate share rule applies to
any
trust that divides post-mortem between a marital and bypass trust.
Regarded as two separate entities each dollar of income earned
by the estate needs to be fractionalized so that we can calculate
respective amounts of DNI to the two trusts.
"This is the devil." In normal probate administration,
it may be awhile before you know the amount of the marital and the
non-marital shares. You won't know the amount of the non-marital
share until much later, to divide the dollar of income that comes
in just after the date of death according to the fraction between
the amounts.
Page 51 states that there is an exception to such rule where the
value of the marital or the bypass trust is frozen in value as of
the date of death and no income or interest is payable to that share.
See footnote 43.14 regarding the need to substitute "interest"
for "income" when freezing the marital share so that you
do not run afoul of the marital deduction rules. Also, this technique
may result in double taxation of the interest in order to avoid
the mess of dealing with separate shares.
An important rule exists for certain specific bequests. For example,
personal property specifically devised to individuals does not carry
out DNI (see page 54.2 of the materials and IRC § 663(a)(1)).
Many people think that a formula marital bequest should fall under
this exception as well, but the government does not take that position.
The IRS says that at the moment of death, you do not know the exact
amount of the marital bequest and thus is not specific enough to
apply under this exception. It is, however, specific enough for
allocation of gain or loss so can result in both DNI income taxation
and capital gains taxation.
Page 77 discusses the selection of a tax year, which can be a fiscal
year for estates but is usually a calendar year for trusts. This
can enable some deferral of income for beneficiaries of estates,
but can also result in bunching. Fiduciaries should think through
these issues before choosing the tax year.
With regard to distributions in kind, these distributions carry-out
DNI to the extent that DNI exists. § 643(e) contains a limitation
on this rule. Certain in-kind distributions do not carry-out DNI
to their full fair market value; rather, they carry-out DNI to the
lesser of fair market value or basis. This applies in circumstances
where the basis of the asset is less than the fair market value,
for the reason that when the beneficiary sells the asset, the beneficiary
will pay the gain of the difference between the sale price and the
basis.
See pages 80-82 of the materials. Note that the trustee may elect
to treat a nonrealization distribution as if it were a sale or exchange,
intentionally recognizing gain on the distribution of property in
kind. The beneficiary would receive a fair market value basis and
the trust would pay the tax which may be beneficial if the
entity is in a lower tax bracket than the beneficiary or if the
entity has losses to off-set. Note that this election would apply
to all in-kind distributions for that tax year. Professor Pennell
says to BE VERY CAREFUL about this particular election.
On page 95 there is a description of other circumstances in which
the distribution of DNI and/or type of distributions made to beneficiaries
can create inequities. While this may result in income tax savings,
it can run afoul of a fiduciary's obligation to treat all beneficiaries
equally. Consider putting a provision in your documents that allows
the fiduciary to make elections for income tax purposes without
having to make a compensation adjustment to beneficiaries treated
unequally.
Page 116.7 of the materials begins the discussion of IRD, which
is Income in Respect of the Decedent. See IRC §691. This is
income earned by the decedent, but which is collected post-mortem.
There is no statutory definition for IRD. Illustrations of IRD are
on page 117 of the materials: the decedent's final paycheck, installment
note payments, and deferred compensation (such as in a qualified
retirement plan).
One of the biggest problems with IRD is that under IRC §1014,
IRD is NOT entitled to a new basis at death. Sometimes, however,
the lack of receipt of a new basis is not such a bad thing because
IRD is entitled to a deduction for the amount of estate tax paid
on the asset. (See page 132-137 of the materials)
BUT, very important, under §691(a)(2) note that (page 139
of the
materials) certain transfers of IRD cause an acceleration of the
income represented by that right, such as distributions in satisfaction
of pecuniary bequests. The transferor will be taxed for built-in
liability in the year of distribution. Professor Pennell says this
issue is as serious as a heart attack and you do not want to accelerate
the built-in-income tax liability. If you have to use IRD to fund
a pecuniary bequest (think marital share) this can be a bad
result and should be considered carefully.
GRANTOR TRUST RULES
Professor Pennell begins the grantor trust rules discussion by
describing a very common misconception. It is street wisdom that
when a grantor trust exists, we ignore the trust for income tax
purposes and all of the income and deductions and losses and credits,
flow through to the grantor as if the trust did not exist. That
vision is okay for a rudimentary understanding or explanation to
your clients, but it is almost 100% WRONG. What the code and regulations
say is that the entity exists, but the items of income, deduction
and loss will be taxed through to the Grantor.
This misconception is based on Rev. Rul. 85-13, which basically
promulgated this misconception as fact. The sale to a defective
grantor trust planning technique is primarily based on this revenue
ruling and on what Professor Pennell believes was a misstatement.
Professor Pennell later states that when the IRS wises up to this
misconception, and the extraordinary planning techniques it allows,
we may be in trouble. Primarily, Professor Pennell thinks that allowing
a transaction to be neither a gift nor a sale is fundamentally wrongheaded
and bizarre and will create problems down the road.
Note that under subchapter E of Chapter 1, "income" means
taxable income whereas under subchapter J, "income" means
fiduciary accounting income.
The most important and difficult aspect of grantor trust rules
are the "portion rules" in the regulations that provide
that you can have a trust which is defective with respect to income
or with respect to the corpus or with respect to the whole of the
trust. Depending on the type of provision that makes the trust defective,
you may or may not have a trust that is defective for the desired
purposes.
Professor Pennell does not think that the definition of "adverse
party" is vague and problematic and thinks a practitioner should
be very careful when relying on adverse party rules to make a trust
defective for income tax purposes. (See page 153 of the materials).
Professor Pennell took special note of § 672(e), the spousal
unit provision, which provides a lot of drafting opportunities where
it would be much more palatable if the grantor's spouse has the
power that makes the trust defective. However, there is uncertainty
with regard to the effect of divorce on the defective nature of
the trust and it is possible that a divorce would destroy the defective
character.
Under IRC § 677, generally, a grantor is treated as the owner
of any portion of a trust as to which the income, without the consent
of an adverse party, either must be paid or, in the discretion of
the grantor, grantor's spouse, or any nonadverse party, may be paid
(or accumulated for future payment) to the grantor or grantor's
spouse.
An exception to the grantor's liability under this section applies
if the trustee has discretion to distribute income for the support
or maintenance of someone the grantor is obligated to support or
maintain. (See page 169 of the materials). This provision is meant
to protect grantors. Notice what this rule does not say. This rule
only applies to discretionary distributions of income and does not
apply to mandatory distributions of income. It applies only to legal
and not contractual obligations. It can create a limit on grantor
trust status when that is otherwise not desirable. An "Upjohn"
provision prohibiting distributions that discharge the obligation
is not effective to avoid exposure. The provision would have to
say that the trustee is prohibited from making any distributions
for support or maintenance to someone the grantor is legally obligated
to support or maintain.
IRC § 674 contains grantor trust rules regarding a grantor's
power to control someone else's beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Section
674(a) is very broad, without the exceptions listed in that code
section, nearly every trust would be a grantor trust.
Exceptions in § 674(c) regarding powers held by persons other
than independent trustees allows a trust to toggle between grantor
and nongrantor trust status by the appointment and resignation of
trustees where there is more than one trustee and some of the trustees
are permitted to be related or subordinate parties.
Note that in §674(b) there are a variety of powers relating
to distributions of income, corpus, or both the use of which
can affect what part of the trust is defective for income tax purposes.
Most people use the §675 administrative powers to create grantor
trusts. Professor Pennell likes the use of 675(3) which makes the
grantor the owner over any portion of the trust that the grantor
or the grantor's spouse actually has borrowed and has not completely
repaid before the tax year began (which necessarily includes all
amounts borrowed during the current tax year). Professor Pennell
thinks that you could use this rule to make a loan on 12/30 of a
year and repay it on 12/31, and still achieve grantor trust status
for that year, without impacting status for the next year.
Many people rely on the power, held in a nonfiduciary capacity,
to substitute property of equivalent value to achieve grantor trust
status. IRC § 675(4) (c). There is no estate tax inclusion
caused as a result of this defect. However, it is difficult to use
this defect as a means to toggle grantor trust status on an off.
Note that a trust can have multiple grantors for income tax purposes,
as can happen under § 678 when there are Crummey powers granted
in a trust. This result creates "pseudo grantors." The
creation of pseudo grantors is not limited to circumstances in which
there is a lapse of a power in excess of the 5x5 power. (See page
187 of the materials).
However, if there is a regular grantor and a pseudo grantor who
could be deemed the owner of the same portion of the trust, the
regular owner will trump.
Starting on page 195, there is a discussion of the portion rules
and which defective grantor trust provisions affect income, corpus
of both. Professor Pennell believes these are perhaps the most important
parts of defective grantor trust planning.
Page 205 of the materials discusses advantages of grantor trust
treatment.
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Our on-site local reporters who are present in Miami this year are
Gene Zuspann Esq. of Zuspann & Zuspann in Denver, Colorado,
Shelly Merritt Esq., a solo practitioner in Boulder, Colorado, Connie
T. Eyster Esq. of Hutchinson, Black & Cook LLC in Boulder, Colorado,
Jason Havens Esq. of Havens & Miller PLLC in Dustin, Florida,
Bruce Stone of Goldman, Felcoski & Stone, PA of Coral Gables,
Florida, Herbert L. Braverman Esq. of Walter & Haverfield LLP
in Cleveland, Ohio, and Jeffry L. Weiler of Benesch, Friedlander,
Coplan & Aronoff LLP of Cleveland, Ohio. The editor again this
year will be Joseph G. Hodges Jr. Esq, a solo practitioner in Denver,
Colorado who is the Chief Moderator of the ABA-PTL List.
GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT INSTITUTE
Inquiries/Registration
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Miami School of Law Center for Continuing Legal Education P.O. Box
248087 Coral Gables, FL 33124-8087
Telephone305-284-4762 / FAX305-284-6752
Web site www.law.miami.edu/heckerling
E-mail heckerling@law.miami.edu
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