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ABA National Online Youth Summit, Fall 1999 Related Cases




 

After City of Chicago v. Morales: If Youth "Hang Out" on the Street, Are They Breaking the Law?

Related Cases

Click on any of the following links for more information about these cases related to Chicago v. Morales.

DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)

Dirk DeJonge was convicted of violating an Oregon law against criminal syndicalism (defending, advocating, or setting up an organization that uses crime, violence, or other unlawful means to bring about governmental or industrial control change). He had helped conduct a meeting organized by the Communist party to protest police shootings of striking workers, and raids on workers’ homes. The Oregon Supreme Court had argued that although DeJonge himself did not advocate any criminal syndicalism, he could be arrested for participation in the meeting, because he had had on his person Communist party literature that promoted criminal syndicalism. The Supreme Court ruled that the law violated DeJonge’s right to free speech and peaceable assembly as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940)

Byron Thornhill was a union president who was arrested for picketing against his former employer, because of an Alabama law that made it an offense to picket. The Court found that the law violated the First Amendment’s free expression guarantee, and held that open discussions about labor were “indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”


Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941)

Five Jehovah’s Witnesses were convicted of violating a Massachusetts state statute prohibiting the holding of parades and processions on public streets without a special license. They argued that the statute violated their rights of freedom of worship, freedom of speech and press, and freedom of assembly. The Court found that the statute did not violate any freedom of speech or freedom of assembly rights; it was a reasonable and fair law set in place to insure public order; specifically, such licenses were necessary to make record of the time and place for events so that preparations could be made to maintain the accessibility of the streets, avoid potential conflicts between separate events, and the license fees paid for the cost of extra policing that the event might require. Further, “no interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions.”


Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)

When Father Arthur Terminiello delivered a speech in a Chicago auditorium criticizing various political and racial groups, as well as the crowd that had gathered to protest, policemen were unable to control the angry crowd, and Terminiello was charged with inciting a riot. The Court overturned Terminiello’s conviction, arguing that such discussion, even if it caused anger, was an essential element of democratic free speech, so long as it did not pose “a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”


Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)

187 black marchers peacefully walked to the South Carolina State House grounds to protest segregation policies. The march was orderly, and did not block vehicle or pedestrian traffic, but 30 police officers ordered the marchers to disperse. They remained, singing religious and patriotic songs, and were arrested and later convicted on a charge of breach of the peace. The Court overturned their convictions, calling the marchers’ actions an exercise of First Amendment rights “in their most pristine and classic form,” and held that South Carolina could not “make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”


Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, (1969)

A group of marchers, accompanied by Chicago police, marched peaceably to the residence of the Mayor to protest segregation. They were asked to stop singing at an appointed time and did so. When onlookers became unruly, police ordered the demonstrators to disperse, which they refused to do, and they were arrested and later convicted of disorderly conduct. The Court ruled that the marchers actions were well within their protected First Amendment rights, and that the conviction under a vaguely-worded ordinance was a violation of their due process rights.


Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)

Fred L. Shuttlesworth, a minister in the process of leading an orderly march to protest the City of Birmingham’s denial of basic civil rights for blacks, was arrested for violating an ordinance requiring permits for such marches. Shuttlesworth had applied for such a permit, but was denied; the ordinance allows the permit commission to refuse a parade permit if its members believe “the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused.” The Court found this language impermissibly vague, and found that the commission’s denial of Shuttlesworth’s group’s request to be discriminatory and an illegal violation of Shuttlesworth’s First Amendment rights in its infringement on his right to free assembly. To quote the opinion, “[because] the terms of [the ordinance] gave the Commission unbridled authority to issue or withhold parade permits without reference to legitimate regulation of public streets and sidewalks, the ordinance would be, absent a limiting construction, unconstitutional.”


Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)

The petitioners in this case were individuals convicted for various reasons-such as not having a good reason for going where they were going, or walking at night-under Jacksonville’s vagrancy law. The Supreme Court found that the vagrancy law did not give concrete guidelines for legal and illegal activities, thus making innocent actions grounds for conviction. They found that the ordinance unconstitutionally offered too much discretion to local police, and too little opportunity to citizens to live as they pleased: “Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance-poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts.”


Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)

Edward Lawson is an African American man, who at the time of this case, wore his hair on long dreadlocks. After being continually harassed and questioned by police when he appeared in white neighborhoods, he challenged a California law “that requires persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a 'credible and reliable' identification and to account for their presence when requested by a police officer.” The Court found that the law gave too much power to police to stop individuals for vaguely-defined reasons, and could unconstitutionally infringe upon citizens’ rights to freedom of movement.


People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna 14 Cal.4th 1090 (1997)

The City of San Jose had obtained injunctions against 38 individuals thought to be members of a criminal street gang. The injunction prevented them from engaging in a variety of illegal activities, including using certain drugs, carrying unlicensed weapons, defacing property, and trespassing. But it also prevented them from engaging in legal activities, such as congregating with associates, wearing clothes bearing certain symbols, and carrying a beeper. The California Supreme Court upheld the injunction, rejecting First Amendment free association objections because "the street gang's conduct" failed "to qualify...as protected forms of association." The court found that city officials had the authority to restrict certain noncriminal activities of habitual lawbreakers in order to assure the freedom of law-abiding citizens who felt menaced by their neighbors.


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