Case Highlights
2004-2005 Term
Following are case highlights for the topic areas of First Amendment and Fourth Amendment. To access other case highlights for the 2004-2005 Term or other terms, or to return to the main Case Highlights page, use the Topic Area menu to the right.
FIRST AMENDMENT
Cutter et al. v. Wilkinson et al.
Docket No. 03-9877
Reversed: The Sixth Circuit
Argued: March 21, 2005
Decided: May 31, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 331
Does the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), which prohibits the government from imposing a substantial burden on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons, improperly advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause?
No. The Court ruled that on its face, the Act does not exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation of religious practices, and is compatible with the Establishment Clause.
From the opinion by Justice Ginsburg (for a unanimous Court):
Foremost, we find RLUIPA's institutionalized-persons provision compatible with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise. … Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries … and they must be satisfied that the Act's prescriptions are and will be administered neutrally among different faiths. … Should inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.
Concurring in the judgment: Justice Thomas
Johanns et al. v. Livestock Marketing Association et al.
and
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Association
Docket Nos. 03-1164 and 03-1165
Vacated: The Eighth Circuit
Argued: December 8, 2004
Decided: May 23, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 173
Does the government violate the First Amendment by compelling all beef producers to pay money to fund generic advertisements for beef?
No. The generic beef advertising is the government's own speech, and is therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.
From the opinion by Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Thomas and Breyer):
In all of the [previous] cases invalidating exactions to subsidize speech, the speech was, or was presumed to be, that of an entity other than the government itself… The message set out in the beef promotions is from beginning to end the message established by the Federal Government… Citizens may challenge compelled support of private speech, but have no First Amendment right not to fund government speech.
Concurring: Justice Thomas
Concurring: Justice Breyer
Concurring in the judgment: Justice Ginsburg
Dissenting: Justice Kennedy
Dissenting: Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy)
McCreary County, Kentucky et al. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky et al.
Docket No. 03-1693
Affirmed: The Sixth Circuit
Argued: March 2, 2005
Decided: June 27, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 298
Is a determination of a local government's purpose a sound basis for ruling on Establishment Clause complaints?
Yes. The counties' manifest objective may be dispositive of the constitutional enquiry in this case, and the development of the ultimate presentation of the Ten Commandments should be considered when determining its purpose.
From the opinion by Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer):
The touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the "First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." … When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides.
Concurring: Justice O'Connor
Dissenting: Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, and joined by Justice Kennedy as to Parts II and III)
San Diego et al. v. Roe
Docket No. 03-1669
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: N/A
Decided: December 6, 2004
For Case Analysis: N/A
Does the First Amendment bar a city from firing a police officer for selling videotapes showing him engaging in sexually explicit acts?
No. The officer's conduct did not fall within the protected category of citizen commentary on matters of public concern.
From the per curiam opinion:
A government employee does not relinquish all First Amendment rights otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by reason of his or her employment. … On the other hand, a governmental employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees, restraints that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public.
FIRST AMENDMENT
Tory et al. v. Cochran et al.
Docket No. 03-1488
Vacated: Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District
Argued: March 22, 2005
Decided: May 31, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 320
Does a permanent injunction issued as a remedy in a defamation action, which prevents all future speech about a public figure, remain in effect after the death of that person?
Yes. The Court ruled that an injunction preventing the petitioners from engaging in speech about the attorney Johnny Cochrane remains in effect, despite his death. However, the injunction has lost its underlying rationale and consequently amounts to an overly broad prior restraint on speech.
From the opinion by Justice Breyer (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg):
The parties have not identified, nor have we found, any source of California law that says the injunction here automatically becomes invalid upon Cochran's death… Given the uncertainty of California law, we take it as a given that the injunction here continues significantly to restrain petitioners' speech, presenting an ongoing federal controversy. Consequently, we need not, and we do not, dismiss this case as moot… At the same time, Johnnie Cochran's death makes it unnecessary, indeed unwarranted, for us to explore petitioners' basic claims… we need only point out that the injunction, as written, has now lost its underlying rationale… Consequently the injunction, as written, now amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking plausible justification. As such, the Constitution forbids it.
Dissenting: Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia)
Van Orden v. Perry et al.
Docket No. 03-1500
Affirmed: The Fifth Circuit
Argued: March 2, 2005
Decided: June 27, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 298
Does the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment allow the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds?
Yes. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and government.
From the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas):
Of course, the Ten Commandments are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious significance. According to Judeo-Christian belief, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses by God on Mt. Sinai. But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning. …. Simply having religious content or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
Concurring: Justice Scalia
Concurring: Justice Thomas
Concurring in the judgment: Justice Breyer
Dissenting: Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
Dissenting: Justice O'Connor
Dissenting: Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg)
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Devenpeck et al. v. Alford
Docket No. 03-710
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: November 8, 2004
Decided: December 13, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 93
Can an arrest be lawful under the Fourth Amendment when the criminal offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is not "closely related" to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of arrest?
Yes. The subjective intent of the arresting officer is no basis for invalidating an arrest.
From the opinion by Justice Scalia (joined by all other members except Chief Justice Rehnquist, who took no part in the decision of the case):
The rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be "closely related" to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest is inconsistent with … precedent. Such a rule makes the lawfulness of an arrest turn upon the motivation of the arresting officer—eliminating, as validating probable cause, facts that played no part in the officer's expressed subjective reason for making the arrest, and offenses that are not "closely related" to that subjective reason. … This means that the constitutionality of an arrest under a given set of known facts will "vary from place to place and from time to time" … depending on whether the arresting officer states the reason for the detention and, if so, whether he correctly identifies a general class of offense for which probable cause exists. An arrest made by a knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a rookie in precisely the same circumstances would not.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Illinois v. Caballes
Docket No. 03-923
Vacated: The Supreme Court of Illinois
Argued: November 10, 2004
Decided: January 24, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 81
Does the Fourth Amendment require reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop?
No. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
From the opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer):
Official conduct that does not "compromise any legitimate interest in privacy" is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. … We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed "legitimate," and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband "compromises no legitimate privacy interest." … This is because the expectation "that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities" is not the same as an interest in "privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable."
Dissenting: Justice Souter
Dissenting: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Souter)
Taking no part: Chief Justice Rehnquist
Supreme Court Preview Home | Briefs |
Cases at a Glance | Case Highlights
Cases of Interest to the School Community
| Featured Cases | Subscribe
to Preview
Related Program Events | Search
| Links
