Case Highlights
2004-2005 Term
Following are case highlights for the topic areas of Election Law, Environmental Law, Equal Footing Doctrine, and Equal Protection. To access other case highlights for the 2004-2005 Term or other terms, or to return to the main Case Highlights page, use the Topic Area menu to the right.
ELECTION LAW
Clingman et al. v. Beaver et al.
Docket No. 04-37
Reversed: The Tenth Circuit
Argued: January 19, 2005
Decided: May 23, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 192
Is a state law that limits a political party's primary elections to party members and independent voters, and excludes registered members of other parties, consistent with the First Amendment's right of association?
Yes. A requirement that voters in a party's primary be either registered members of the party or independents does not severely burden associational rights, and is consistent with the First Amendment. Any burden the system imposes is justified by legitimate state interests.
From the opinion by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and joined in part by Justices O'Connor and Breyer):
Regulations that impose severe burdens on associational rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. However, when regulations impose lesser burdens, "a State's important regulatory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." We are persuaded that any burden Oklahoma's semiclosed primary imposes is minor and justified by legitimate state interests.
Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: Justice O'Connor (joined in part by Justice Breyer)
Dissenting: Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Ginsburg, and joined in part by Justice Souter)
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
Docket No. 02-1192
Reversed: The Fifth Circuit
Argued: October 6, 2004
Decided: December 13, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 37
When "responsible parties" clean up voluntarily, can they use Superfund to get some of their cleanup costs back?
No. A private party who has not been sued under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) §106 or §107(a) may not obtain contribution under §113(f)(1) from other liable parties.
From the opinion by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer):
Section 113(f)(1) does not authorize Aviall's suit. The first sentence, the enabling clause that establishes the right of contribution, provides: "Any person may seek contribution . . . during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title," 42 U. S. C. §9613(f)(1) (emphasis added). The natural meaning of this sentence is that contribution may only be sought subject to the specified conditions, namely, "during or following" a specified civil action.
Dissenting: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Stevens)
EQUAL FOOTING DOCTRINE
Alaska v. United States
Docket No. 128, Orig
Affirmed: Report of Special Master
Argued: January 10, 2005
Decided: June 6, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 203
Does the state of Alaska have title to submerged lands in southeast Alaska that, like those underlying Glacier Bay, have been claimed by the federal government since Alaska's statehood?
No. The United States overcame the state's presumption of title and defeated its claims under the equal footing doctrine (that new states should come into the Union on an equal footing with the 13 original states and have title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries) by showing that the United States set the submerged lands aside before statehood in a way that shows it intended to retain title.
From the opinion by Justice Kennedy (for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, and IV; for the Court with respect to Part V (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer; and for the Court with respect to Part VI (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas except as to those portions related to Part V):
It is now settled that the United States can defeat a future State's presumed title to submerged lands not only by conveyance to third parties but also by setting submerged lands aside as part of a federal reservation such as a wildlife refuge. To ascertain whether Congress has made use of that power, we conduct a two-step inquiry. We first inquire whether the United States clearly intended to include submerged lands within the reservation. If the answer is yes, we next inquire whether the United States expressed its intent to retain federal title to submerged lands within the reservation. We will not infer an intent to defeat a future State's title to inland submerged lands unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain. After careful consideration of the parties' arguments, the Special Master recommended granting summary judgment to the United States on Alaska's claim of title to the submerged lands underlying Glacier Bay. His recommendation rested on two conclusions that track the two-part test developed in our precedents. First, he concluded that in creating Glacier Bay National Monument the United States had reserved the submerged lands underlying Glacier Bay and the remaining waters within the monument's boundaries. Second, he concluded that §6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act expressed Congressional intent to retain those submerged lands in federal ownership.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas)
EQUAL PROTECTION
Johnson v. California et al.
Docket No. 03-636
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: November 2, 2004
Decided: February 23, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 384
Is strict scrutiny the proper standard for review for an equal protection challenge to the California Department of Corrections' (CDC) practice of temporarily segregating prisoners by race while they are being evaluated for a permanent housing assignment?
Yes. The Court decided that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review for an equal protection challenge to the CDC's policy.
From the opinion by Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer):
We have held that "all racial classifications [imposed by government]… must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Under strict scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications "are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests."… The reasons for strict scrutiny are familiar. Racial classifications raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious purpose… We therefore apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to "'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool."… On remand, the CDC will have the burden of demonstrating that its policy is narrowly tailored with regard to new inmates as well as transferees. Prisons are dangerous places, and the special circumstances they present may justify racial classifications in some contexts. Such circumstances can be considered in applying strict scrutiny, which is designed to take relevant differences into account.
Concurring: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer)
Dissenting: Justice Stevens
Dissenting: Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia)
Taking no part: Chief Justice Rehnquist
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