Case Highlights
2004-2005 Term
Following are case highlights for the topic areas of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure. To access other case highlights for the 2004-2005 Term or other terms, or to return to the main Case Highlights page, use the Topic Area menu to the right.
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States
Docket No. 04-368
Reversed: The Fifth Circuit
Argued: April 27, 2005
Decided: May 31, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 405
Did the jury instructions in this case properly convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction?
No. A unanimous Court held that the jury instructions given in the district court failed to properly convey the elements of a "corrupt persuasion" conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), which makes it a crime to "knowingly . . . corruptly persuad[e] another person . . . with intent to . . . cause" that person to "withhold" documents from, or "alter" documents for use in, an "official proceeding."
From the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist (for a unanimous Court):
[T]the jury instructions at issue simply failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing. Indeed, it is striking how little culpability the instructions required. For example, the jury was told that, "even if [petitioner] honestly and sincerely believed that its conduct was lawful, you may find [petitioner] guilty." … The instructions also diluted the meaning of "corruptly" so that it covered innocent conduct.
CRIMINAL LAW
Pasquantino et al. v. United States
Docket No. 03-725
Affirmed: The Fourth Circuit
Argued: November 9, 2004
Decided: April 26, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 89
Can the United States prosecute Americans for using interstate wires to defraud the Canadian government?
Yes. The Court held that a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue (by smuggling alcohol into Canada, in this case) violates the federal wire statute. The common law revenue rule, which generally bars the courts from enforcing the tax laws of foreign sovereigns, does not preclude the U.S. government from prosecuting the petitioners.
From the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor and Kennedy):
The [federal wire fraud] statute prohibits using interstate wires to effect "any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises."… Canada's entitlement is "property" as that word is used in the wire fraud statute … [and] petitioners' plot was a "scheme or artifice to defraud" Canada of its valuable entitlement to tax revenue. … [R]evenue rule jurisprudence is no clear bar to this prosecution. … It may seem an odd use of the Federal Government's resources to prosecute a U.S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada. But the broad language of the wire fraud statute authorizes it to do so and no canon of statutory construction permits us to read the statute more narrowly.
Dissenting: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer and joined as to Parts II and III by Justices Scalia and Souter)
CRIMINAL LAW
Small v. United States
Docket No. 03-750
Reversed: The Third Circuit
Argued: November 3, 2004
Decided: April 26, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 85
Does a federal law criminalizing possession of a firearm by anyone "convicted in any court" include convictions entered in foreign countries?
No. The Court held that the phrase "convicted in any court" encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.
From the opinion of the Court delivered by Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg):
[C]onsidered as a group, foreign convictions differ from domestic convictions in important ways. Past foreign convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year's imprisonment may include a conviction for conduct that domestic laws would permit, for example, for engaging in economic conduct that our society might encourage… And they would include a conviction for conduct that domestic law punishes far less severely…. These considerations… convince us that we should apply an ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically oriented statutes here—an assumption that helps us determine Congress' intent… We consequently assume a congressional intent that the phrase "convicted in any court" applies domestically, not extraterritorially. But, at the same time, we stand ready to revise this assumption should statutory language, context, history, or purpose show the contrary… We have found no convincing indication to the contrary here. The statute's language does not suggest any intent to reach beyond domestic convictions… [W]e conclude that the phrase "convicted in any court" refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts.
Dissenting: Justice Thomas (joined by Justices Scalia and Kennedy)
Taking no part: Chief Justice Rehnquist
CRIMINAL LAW
Whitfield v. United States
and
Hall v. United States
Docket Nos. 03-1293 and 03-1294
Affirmed: The Eleventh Circuit
Argued: November 30, 2004
Decided: January 11, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 146
Is an overt act an element of the crime of conspiracy to commit money laundering?
No. Does a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1956(h), require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy?
From the opinion by Justice O'Connor (for a unanimous Court):
[T]hese decisions "follow the settled principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory terms. … We have consistently held that the common law understanding of conspiracy "does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a condition of liability."
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Halbert v. Michigan
Docket No. 03-10198
Vacated: The Court of Appeals of Michigan
Argued: April 25, 2005
Dismissed: June 23, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 390
Is Michigan constitutionally required to appoint counsel to help indigent defendants who were convicted after pleading guilty to prepare a petition to the appellate court asking it to exercise its discretion to allow the defendant to appeal from his or her conviction?
Yes. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who seek access to first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
From the opinion by Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer):
Navigating the appellate process without a lawyer's assistance is a perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond the competence of individuals, like Halbert, who have little education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments. … Appeals by defendants convicted on their pleas may involve "myriad and often complicated" substantive issues … and may be "no less complex than other appeals." …
Dissenting: Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia, and by Chief Justice Rehnquist as to all but Part III-B-3)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Johnson v. California
Docket No. 04-6964
Reversed: The Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District
Argued: April 18, 2005
Decided: June 13, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 384
To establish a prima facie case under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986), must the objector show that it is more likely than not that the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias?"
No. Instead, a defendant satisfies Batson's first-step requirements by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.
From the opinion by Justice Stevens (Joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer):
The disagreements among the state-court judges who reviewed the record in this case illustrate the imprecision of relying on judicial speculation to resolve plausible claims of discrimination. In this case the inference of discrimination was sufficient to invoke a comment by the trial judge "that 'we are very close,' " and on review, the California Supreme Court acknowledged that "it certainly looks suspicious that all three African-American prospective jurors were removed from the jury." … Those inferences that discrimination may have occurred were sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson.
Concurring: Justice Breyer
Dissenting: Justice Thomas
Kowalski et al. v. Tesmer et al.
Docket No. 03-407
Reversed: The Sixth Circuit
Argued: October 4, 2004
Decided: December 13, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 23
Can attorneys invoke the rights of hypothetical indigents to challenge Michigan's procedure for appointing appellate counsel for indigent defendants who plead guilty?
No. The Court ruled that the attorneys lack standing and therefore did not reach the question of the procedure's constitutionality.
From the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined):
While we agree that an attorney would be valuable to a criminal defendant challenging the constitutionality of the scheme, we do not think that the lack of an attorney here is the type of hindrance necessary to allow another to assert the indigent defendants' rights.
Concurring: Justice Thomas
Dissenting: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Muehler et al. v. Mena
Docket No. 03-1423
Vacated: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: December 8, 2004
Decided: March 22, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 156
Does certain police behavior, including detention of a person in handcuffs, and questioning a person about her immigration rights, that occurs while police detain an occupant of a house being searched pursuant to a valid search warrant, violate the Fourth Amendment?
No. The Court decided that the detention of an occupant of the house for the duration of the search was reasonable because of the governmental interest in minimizing the risk of harm to both officers and occupants, and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The officers' questioning of the respondent about her immigration status did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
From the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas):
Mena's detention for the duration of the search was reasonable under [Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692 (1981)] because a warrant existed to search 1363 Patricia Avenue and she was an occupant of that address at the time of the search. … Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention… The officers' use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Mena's detention in the garage, as well as the detention of the three other occupants, was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion… We have "held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure."… Hence, the officers did not need reasonable suspicion to ask Mena for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration status.
Concurring: Justice Kennedy
Concurring in the judgment: Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Smith v. Massachusetts
Docket No. 03-8661
Reversed: Appeals Court of Massachusetts
Argued: December 1, 2004
Decided: February 22, 2005
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 169
When a judge makes a mid-trial finding on an unlawful possession count, does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit her from subsequently reversing her ruling and allowing the issue to go to the jury?
Yes. The trial judge's mid-trial ruling met the definition of an acquittal consistently used in the Supreme Court's double jeopardy cases; the Double Jeopardy Clause then forbade the judge to reconsider the acquittal later in the trial.
From the opinion by Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter and Thomas):
[W]e have long held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict… Having concluded that the judge acquitted petitioner of the firearm-possession charge, we must turn to the more difficult question whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permitted her to reconsider that acquittal once petitioner and his codefendant had rested their cases… The Double Jeopardy Clause's guarantee cannot be allowed to become a potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it. If, after a facially unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count, the trial has proceeded to the defendant's introduction of evidence, the acquittal must be treated as final, unless the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence. That requirement was not met here.
Dissenting: Justice Ginsburg (joined by Chief justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer)
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