Case Highlights
2003-2004 Term
Following are case highlights for the topic areas of Fourth Amendment and FOIA. To access other case highlights for the 2004-2005 Term or other terms, or to return to the main Case Highlights page, use the Topic Area menu to the right.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Arizona v. Gant
Docket No. 02-1019
Vacated and remanded: Arizona Court of Appeals
Argued: N/A
Decided: N/A
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 52
When Can Police Search a Car After Making an Arrest?
On October 20, without opinion, the Court vacated the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in this case for reconsideration in light of an intervening Arizona Supreme Court decision, State v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429 (Ariz. 2003).
Groh v. Ramirez et al.
Docket No. 02-811
Affirmed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: November 4, 2003
Decided: February 24, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 94
Did an ATF agent's search of respondents' home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the "persons or things to be seized" (1) violate the Fourth Amendment, and (2) if so, is the petitioner nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity, given that a magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search?
(1) Yes. The Court ruled that the warrant did not meet the Fourth Amendment's unambiguous requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] . . . the persons or things to be seized."
(2) No. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity despite the constitutional violation because it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.
From the opinion by Justice Stevens (joined by Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer):
The warrant was plainly invalid. The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Emphasis added.) The warrant in this case complied with the first three of these requirements: It was based on probable cause and supported by a sworn affidavit, and it described particularly the place of the search. On the fourth requirement, however, the warrant failed altogether. The fact that the application adequately described the "things to be seized" does not save the warrant from its facial invalidity. The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents. Given that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid. Moreover, because petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's assurance that the warrant contained an adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid.
Dissenting: Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist)
Dissenting: Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia and in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist)
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Illinois v. Lidster
Docket No. 02-682
Reversed: The Supreme Court of Illinois
Argued: November 5, 2003
Decided: January 13, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 77
Did a highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run accident violate the Fourth Amendment?
No. The Court ruled that a checkpoint established to seek information from the public is not the kind of event that involves suspicion of the relevant individual.
From the opinion by Justice Breyer (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas and in part by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg):
The stop's primary law enforcement purpose was not to determine whether a vehicle's occupants were committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others. The police expected the information elicited to help them apprehend, not the vehicle's occupants, but other individuals. [We do not believe] that the Fourth Amendment would have us apply an Edmond-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now before us. [T]he context here (seeking information from the public) is one in which, by definition, the concept of individualized suspicion has little role to play. Like certain other forms of police activity, say, crowd control or public safety, an information-seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual. Most importantly, the stops interfered only minimally with liberty of the sort the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect. Viewed objectively, each stop required only a brief wait in line -- a very few minutes at most.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg)
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Maryland v. Pringle
Docket No. 02-809
Reversed: The Court of Appeals of Maryland
Argued: November 3, 2003
Decided: December 15, 2003
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 62
Did a police officer have probable cause to arrest for cocaine possession a front-seat passenger in a car based on the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest?
Yes. A unanimous Court ruled that it was an entirely reasonable inference from the facts that any or all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
From the unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances. We have stated, however, that "[t]he substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized. In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the three men failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money. We think it an entirely reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Thornton v. United States
Docket No. 03-5165
Affirmed: The Fourth Circuit
Argued: March 31, 2004
Decided: May 24, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 323
Does the rule of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (which holds that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest) govern even when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle?
Yes. The Court ruled that the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and evidence destruction as one who is inside.
From the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer and in part by Justice O'Connor):
There is simply no basis to conclude that the span of the area generally within the arrestee's immediate control is determined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer's direction, or whether the officer initiated contact with him while he remained in the car. In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the vehicle. A custodial arrest is fluid and "[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty," United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973), at 234-235. The stress is no less merely because the arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an arrestee less likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle. In either case, the officer faces a highly volatile situation. It would make little sense to apply two different rules to what is, at bottom, the same situation.
Concurring in part: Justice O'Connor
Concurring: Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
Dissenting: Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Souter)
FOURTH AMENDMENT
United States v. Banks
Docket No. 02-173
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: October 15, 2003
Decided: December 2, 2003
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 42
Did law enforcement officers executing a search warrant for cocaine satisfy the Fourth Amendment by waiting 15-to-20 seconds before making a forcible entry after a knock-and-announcement?
Yes. A unanimous Court ruled that the risk of losing easily disposable evidence constituted exigent circumstances making forced entry by destruction of property permissible.
From the unanimous opinion by Justice Souter:
When a warrant applicant gives reasonable grounds to expect futility or to suspect that one or another such exigency already exists or will arise instantly upon knocking, a magistrate judge is acting within the Constitution to authorize a "no-knock" entry. And even when executing a warrant silent about that, if circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in. [T]he issue comes down to whether it was reasonable to suspect imminent loss of evidence after the 15 to 20 seconds the officers waited prior to forcing their way. Though we agree with Judge Fisher's dissenting opinion that this call is a close one, 282 F.3d, at 707, we think that after 15 or 20 seconds without a response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were reticent any longer. Courts of Appeals have, indeed, routinely held similar wait times to be reasonable in drug cases with similar facts including easily disposable evidence (and some courts have found even shorter ones to be reasonable enough).
FOURTH AMENDMENT
United States v. Flores-Montano
Docket No. 02-1794
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: February 25, 2004
Decided: March 30, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 283
Did a suspicionless search and seizure of marijuana from the respondent's automobile's fuel tank at an international border violate the Fourth Amendment?
No. A unanimous Court ruled that the government's authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank.
From the unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
[T]he reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person -- dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched -- simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to determine what is a "routine" search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more "intrusive" search of a person, have no place in border searches of vehicles. The Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border. Time and again, we have stated that "searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border." United States v. Ramsey, 431 U. S. 606, 616 (1977).
Concurring: Justice Breyer
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish et al.
Docket No. 02-954
Reversed: The Ninth Circuit
Argued: December 3, 2003
Decided: March 30, 2004
For Case Analysis: See ABA Preview 112
Does the privacy claim of Vincent Foster's family outweigh the public interest in the disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of 10 death-scene photographs?
Yes. A unanimous Court ruled that, when there is a privacy interest protected by FOIA Exemption 7(C) and the public interest asserted is to show that responsible officials acted improperly, the requester must produce evidence to support a reasonable belief that the alleged government impropriety might have occurred.
From the unanimous opinion by Justice Kennedy:
The family does not invoke Exemption 7(C) on behalf of Vincent Foster in its capacity as his next friend for fear that the pictures may reveal private information about Foster to the detriment of his own posthumous reputation or some other interest personal to him. If that were the case, a different set of considerations would control. Foster's relatives instead invoke their own right and interest to personal privacy. [W]e think it proper to conclude from Congress' use of the term "personal privacy" that it intended to permit family members to assert their own privacy rights against public intrusions long deemed impermissible under the common law and in our cultural traditions. Where the privacy concerns addressed by Exemption 7(C) are present, the exemption requires the person requesting the information to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen must show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having the information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.
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