Pro Se/Unbundling Resource Center
Cases
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 520 (1971)
Plaintiff-inmate filed pro se complaint against prison seeking compensation for damages sustained while placed
in solitary confinement. In finding plaintiff's complaint legally sufficient, Supreme Court found that pro se
pleadings should be held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys.
Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971)
Pro se petitioner who asserted complete ignorance of the law subsequently presented a brief that was manifestly
written by a person with legal knowledge. Court held that a brief prepared in any substantial part by a member of the
bar must be signed by that member.
Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 601 (1993)
Plaintiff who consulted defendants' law firms regarding workers' compensation claim was not advised of potential for
additional third party claim before statue of limitations expired. Defendants argued that plaintiff's representation
was limited only to filing workers' compensation claim and no duty existed to advise plaintiff in any other matter.
Court found that representation was not limited solely to workers compensation claim, and defendants should have
advised plaintiff regarding third party claim.
Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994)
Former sheriff department workers bring sexual harassment suit against county sheriff in his individual and official
capacities. Attorney representing sheriff enters limited appearance on behalf of his official capacity. Court finds
that attorney cannot enter limited appearance on behalf of sheriff's official capacity. Attorney representing sheriff
must act for the entire person, including individual and official capacities. Entering such limited appearance is not
competent and zealous representation as required by ethical rules as it leaves officer undefended on individual
capacity claims. Court further finds that ghostwriting of documents for pro se litigants may subject lawyers
to contempt of court. Ghostwriting gives litigants unfair advantage in that pro se pleadings are construed liberally
and pro se litigants are granted greater latitude in hearings and trials. Ghostwriting also results in evasion
of obligations imposed on attorneys by statute, code, and rule, and involves lawyers in litigants' misrepresentation
of pro se status in violation of ethical rules.
Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997)
Over a period of time, pro se plaintiffs submitted pleadings that had been written by attorneys pursuant to
discrete-task representation contracts. The attorneys did not sign the pleadings, and in most cases did not appear
as counsel of record. When ordered to show cause by the court as to why they should not be held in contempt of court,
attorneys argued that the professional relationships created with the litigants ended once they had drafted the
pleadings. Court held that there was insufficient evidence to show that the attorneys knowingly misled the court or
intentionally violated ethical or procedural rules and declined to impose sanctions. However, court stated that the
practice of ghostwriting pleadings without acknowledging authorship and without asking court approval to withdraw
from representation was inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and Rule 83.1(G) of the Local Rules for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Court stated that allowing attorneys to ghostwrite pleadings for
pro se plaintiffs abused additional leeway given to pro se filings.
Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F.Supp. 884 (D.Kan. 1997)
In suit brought by pro se plaintiff, defendants sought order requiring plaintiff to disclose whether she was an
attorney or received the assistance of a lawyer. In expressing legal and ethical concerns regarding the ghostwriting
of pleadings by attorneys, the court held the defendants were entitled to the order.
U.S. v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F.Supp. 361 (E.D.Pa. 1997)
Court finds that ghostwriting by attorney for a pro se litigant implicates an attorney's duty of candor to the
court, interferes with the court's ability to supervise the litigation, and misrepresents the litigant's right to more
liberal construction as a pro se litigant.
Ricotta v. California, 4 F.Supp.2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998)
Attorney licensed in the State of California did not violate procedural, substantive, and professional rules of a
federal court by lending some assistance to friends, family members, and others with whom she shared specialized
knowledge. Attorney performed research and prepared rough drafts of portions of pro se litigant's pleadings
in an action against various official defendants, but did not sign the documents. Because attorney did not gather and
anonymously present legal arguments with the actual or constructive knowledge that plaintiff would use them in court,
and because attorney did not engage in extensive, undisclosed participation that permitted plaintiff to falsely appear
as being without professional assistance, attorney had not violated any rules.
Ostrovsky v. Monroe (In re Ellingson), 230 B.R. 426 (Bankr.D.Mont. 1999)
Paralegal who helped a business draft and file bankruptcy papers was found to be engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Court notes that if an attorney acted in the same manner as paralegal, that person would be guilty of "ghost
writing," which is described as the act of undisclosed attorney who assists a self-represented litigant by drafting
his or her pleadings as part of "unbundled" or limited legal services. Court also notes that ghostwriting violates
court rules, particularly Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, as well as ABA Standing Committee Opinion 1414 in Ethics and Professional
Responsibility.
Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, 2000 WL 1611123 (S.D. Ohio)
Respondent argues that the Petition should be stricken pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 because, although allegedly filed
pro se, petitioner clearly received substantial assistance from counsel in the preparation and filing of the
Petition. Court finds that if a pleading is prepared in any substantial part by a member of the bar, it must be
signed by that attorney to avoid misrepresentation.
Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)
Lawyer participated in ghostwriting appellate brief for a pro se litigant. Court holds that participation by
an attorney in drafting otherwise pro se appellate brief is per se substantial legal assistance, and
must be acknowledged by signature. An attorney must refuse to provide ghostwriting assistance unless purported
pro se client specifically commits to disclose attorney's assistance to the court upon filing.
Lynne v. Laufer, No. A-2079-01T2, (N.J. Super. App. Div. Apr. 8, 2003)
Attorney, with matrimonial client's consent after consultation, limited the scope of his representation to a review of
the terms of a mediated agreement without going outside its four corners. Court holds that it is not a breach of the
standard of care for an attorney under a signed precisely drafted consent agreement to limit the scope of
representation to not perform such services in the course of representing a matrimonial client that he or she might
otherwise perform absent such a consent.
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