
Protecting Transgender Families: Strategies for Advocates
By Taylor Flynn
Divorce is never easy. Your life partner may now be a bitter enemy,
your means of economic support may be in jeopardy, and custody of your
children may be at risk. How could the stakes be any higher? Ask Michael
Kantaras, J'Noel Gardiner, Kristie Littleton, or any of the married
transgender women and men in the United States. For a transgender (trans)
man or woman, what begins as the dissolution of a relationship may be
transformed into a public nightmare in which the individual is forced
to defend the authenticity of his or her gender in the face of relentless,
brutal, and humiliating questions about the most intimate details of
personal anatomy and sexual practices.
In 2002 this possibility became a reality for Michael Kantaras, a transsexual
man in Clearwater, Florida. Although born with female genitalia, Michael
grew up with a deep-seated identity as a male. In 1985, at the age of
twenty-three, Michael went through the difficult process of making his
life congruent with his sense of self by undergoing sex-reassignment,
including hormone therapy, chest surgery, and surgeries to remove his
internal female genitalia. A few years later, Michael fell in love and
married Linda Kantaras, after telling her about his transgender status.
At the time they married, Linda had an infant son from a prior relationship.
Michael adopted Linda's son, and the couple had a second child through
alternative insemination. Michael and Linda were married for ten years.
When Michael filed for divorce, the court-appointed custody evaluator
concluded that he was by far the more stable and qualified parent and
recommended that he be given primary custody of the couple's two children.
Instead of focusing on the children's best interests, however, the
proceedings very quickly centered on Linda's claim that Michael was
legally female, which, if accepted by the court, would have rendered
their marriage a legally invalid same-sex union and jeopardized Michael's
parental rights. Drawing on anti-gay case law holding that, absent adoption,
nonbiological gay and lesbian parents have no legal rights to their
children, Linda argued that Michael was not a legal parent of the child
born through alternative insemination. Linda also argued that Michael's
adoption was invalid because Florida bans adoption by gay and lesbian
parents. In short, Michael faced not only the loss of custody but also
the loss of any right to be considered a parent in the eyes of the law
or to maintain any contact with his children. With a signature from
a judge's pen, his marriage, his parenthood, and even his gender could
be erased.
In a three-and-a-half-week trial televised on Court TV, Michael and
other witnesses were grilled about the appearance of Michael's body,
the shape and size of his genitalia, his sexual capacities and practices,
his ability to urinate standing up, and the details of his medical diagnosis
and treatment as a transsexual person. Fortunately, the trial judge
ultimately found Michael to be legally male, affirmed the validity of
his marriage, and granted him custody of both children in an 800-plus-page
decision issued on February 21, 2003. Available at www.transgenderlaw.org.
Just a few months later, in April 2003, a trial court in Chicago came
to the opposite conclusion in a case involving similar facts. In Chicago,
the trial judge ruled that Sterling S., a transsexual man who had undergone
extensive medical treatment and lived exclusively as a man for more
than twenty years, was nonetheless legally female, that his fifteen-year
marriage to his wife Jennifer was invalid, and that he was not a legal
parent to the couple's ten-year-old son. Both decisions are now on appeal.
Two other decisions involving transgender spouses have made the headlines
in the past few years. Christie Littleton is a transsexual woman residing
in Texas. After Christie's husband died in surgery, she filed a medical
malpractice claim. The doctor responded by arguing that the couple's
marriage was invalid and that she did not have standing to bring a wrongful
death claim. The trial court dismissed Christie's claim on that basis.
The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, concluding that "Christie
was created and born a male" and continued to be legally male,
regardless of her gender identity or how much medical treatment she
had undergone. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
Shortly thereafter, J'Noel Gardiner, a transsexual woman in Kansas,
faced a similar challenge to the validity of her marriage, with a similar
outcome. When J'Noel's husband died intestate, his estranged son sued
to invalidate the couple's marriage in order to inherit their estate.
The trial court ruled in the son's favor, and the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court decision in an opinion that drew heavily upon
the decision in Littleton. Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
As advocates for transgender spouses and parents, lawyers can at least
strive to protect their clients from such devastation by educating the
court on key issues concerning transgender identity and presenting the
court with persuasive legal arguments for relying on a transgender person's
gender identity, rather than specific medical treatments, to determine
the person's legal sex.
Overview of Terms
Traditionally, "sex" refers to a person's sexual anatomy,
whereas "gender" refers to the qualities society considers
masculine or feminine. "Transgender" is an umbrella term that
encompasses all people who are gender nonconforming, such as transsexual
and intersexed persons, "masculine" women or "effeminate"
men, and gay, bisexual, and lesbian people. As the following discussion
suggests, however, the distinction is not always clear, and the terms
often are used interchangeably. An extensive body of medical and psychological
knowledge demonstrates that sex is not a rigid male-female binary but
a sum of components, including physical characteristics (external and
internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, and secondary sex
characteristics) and gender identity, or a person's internal psychological
identification as female or male. The components typically line up so
that birth anatomy corresponds to gender identity.
In transsexual people, the individual's physical characteristics correspond
to one sex while gender identity corresponds to the other. Trans men
like Michael Kantaras and Sterling S. are often known as female-to-male
transsexuals (FTMs); trans women like Christie Littleton and J'Noel
Gardiner may be known as male-to-female transsexuals (or MTFs). In 1979,
an international organization of medical and psychological experts began
developing a medical protocol, or standards of care, to provide guidelines
for the diagnosis and treatment of transsexual people. Available at
www.hbigda.org. These guidelines are designed to ensure that each patient
receives an individualized assessment to determine which medical treatments,
if any, are necessary to bring the person's gender presentation or anatomy
into harmony with his or her gender identity.
Another group of people-estimated at one in 2,000-is born intersexed,
which is the contemporary term used to describe people who possess a
combination of physical characteristics typically associated with both
males and females. For example, intersexed people may have ambiguous
genitalia or chromosomes that do not neatly fit into the categories
of XX or XY. When a person's gender identity and physical characteristics
conflict, medical and psychological experts overwhelmingly agree that
gender identity is the primary determinant of sex, not anatomy.
A Judicial Split
Judicial approaches to determining a person's legal sex generally fall
into two camps. The majority approach ignores decades of medical and
psychological data to conclude that sex is determined exclusively and
unchangeably by a person's genitalia at birth. Courts adopting this
approach often invoke God or nature. In Christie Littleton's case, for
instance, the court framed the issue as whether sex is "immutably
fixed by our Creator at birth" and concluded, "There are some
things we cannot will into being. They just are." Littleton, 9
S.W.3d at 224, 231.
In J'Noel Gardiner's case, the Kansas Supreme Court case looked to
Webster's Dictionary for the definition of "sex," concluding
that transsexual people do not fit within that definition and hence
are not covered by Kansas's marriage statute. "The words 'sex,'
'male,' and 'female' in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals.
The plain, ordinary meaning of 'persons of the opposite sex' [found
in the marriage statute] contemplates a biological man and a biological
woman and not persons who are [transsexual]." Gardiner, 42 P.3d
at 120.
In contrast, a small but growing minority of courts in the United States
and internationally have concluded that the legal sex of transgender
litigants is the sex corresponding to their gender identity. As early
as 1976, a New Jersey court ruled that a transsexual woman was legally
female, stating that when birth anatomy and gender identity conflict,
the role of anatomy is secondary. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1976). In a more recent decision, an Australian family court similarly
upheld the validity of a marriage involving a transsexual man. The court
cited expert testimony that "brain . . . or mental sex . . . .
[is thought to] explain the persistence of a gender identity in the
face of . . . external influences" and concluded that the transgender
litigant in the case "is and always has been psychologically male."
Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 131, 132 (discussing In re Kevin).
In Kantaras, the Florida trial court reviewed the extensive medical
and psychological testimony presented in the case and concluded, based
upon that testimony, that gender identity is the primary determinant
of sex. The judge stated, "There should be no legal barrier, cognizable
social taboo, or reason grounded in Florida public policy to prevent
Michael's [being declared legally male] . . . . From a medical standpoint,
Michael is of the male gender and has been his entire life." As
the opinions in these cases suggest, because gender identity is fixed
at a young age, trans people do not "change" their sex; rather,
they bring their gender presentation or anatomy into harmony with their
gender identity.
The Gender Identity Standard
That transsexualism is a recognized medical condition with an established
course of treatment raises the issue of whether specific procedures,
such as hormone therapy or surgical interventions, will be required
for a person to be legally recognized as male or female.
Ideally, courts should apply the standard used by medical and psychological
experts: that a person's sex is determined by his or her gender identity.
In Kantaras, for example, the trial court rightly concluded that it
would be absurd to withhold legal recognition of Michael's male gender
given that Michael's gender identity was male, that he had undergone
extensive and irreversible medical treatments for the purpose of sex-reassignment,
and that he was seen and accepted as a man by everyone in his daily
life, including family, friends, employers, and acquaintances. Although
Michael had not undergone a phalloplasty (the surgical construction
of a penis), the court did not find this to be dispositive in view of
the uncontested expert testimony that Michael's gender identity was
unambiguously male and that he had completed all of the medical treatments
recommended to him by his doctors and therapists.
In Kantaras, the judge specifically acknowledged and relied upon the
extensive medical information presented in the case, including testimony
that many medical experts on transsexualism counsel against phalloplasty
because it presents risks of permanent loss of orgasmic capability,
severe scarring, and irreversible damage to the urethra. Moreover-in
addition to the cost, which may exceed $100,000-medical technology has
not advanced to the stage where the procedure results in a functioning
penis. Because the medical establishment can surgically construct fully
functioning vaginas but not penises, reliance on surgery in this situation
would have a starkly different impact on trans women than trans men.
In view of these considerations, the judge in Kantaras declined to hold
that phalloplasty is required for a transgender woman to be recognized
as legally male, since any such requirement would be at odds with current
medical knowledge and practice. In contrast, in the Chicago case, the
trial court relied on the "lack" of genital reconstructive
surgery to declare Sterling S. to be legally female, despite his male
gender identity, extensive medical treatments, and twenty-plus years
of living and being accepted as a man.
That the court's decision in Kantaras was shaped by expert medical
testimony strongly suggests that providing such medical data is advisable
to ensure that courts have the information they need to make informed
decisions. The fact that the opinion was 800 pages long raises questions,
however. If courts require extensive expert evidence and undertake detailed,
individualized inquiries into a person's medical history, what recourse
exists for clients who do not have access to experts or adequate medical
care? Will certain surgeries or hormonal therapies become required?
What if the client does not believe medical treatment is appropriate
for him- or herself?
While courts desperately need the kinds of information provided to
the judge in Kantaras, that court's complex, highly medicalized inquiry
has the potential to create almost as many problems as it solves. The
better approach is for courts to point to the medical standards of care,
which conclude that sex is determined by gender identity: the court
then needs only to look to the person's gender identity to determine
his or her legal sex. Recognition of gender identity should provide
the law with a consistent, relatively simple approach that accords with
medically accepted standards yet at the same time permits the flexibility
that the standards of care contemplate.
Annulment of Marriage
Despite excellent lawyering, a court may follow the majority of courts
and invalidate the client's marriage. What does this mean for custody?
Under early American law, when a marriage was invalidated or annulled,
courts did not divide property or determine custody as they would in
a divorce. Instead, these courts attempted to return parties to their
"original" positions. This meant that property (which, at
the time, included children) was returned to the property holders, who
were men. As a result of such injustices, modern doctrine provides that,
for purposes of determining property division, support, and custody,
annulment should be treated just like divorce. See, e.g., 63 A.L.R.2d
1008 (West 2002). Crucially, then, non-biological, transgender parents
should not lose their legal rights to their children simply because
their marriage has been annulled.
Advocates representing transgender spouses and parents should be prepared
to assert this doctrine in the event that clients are denied legal recognition
of their gender. In the worst case scenario, one in which a court rules
that a transgender client is not a legal parent, the doctrine of functional
parenthood may provide protection if the jurisdiction decides to follow
the recent rulings by the highest courts in Massachusetts and New Jersey.
Both courts held that, although the litigants had not adopted their
partner's child, the nonbiological lesbian mother in each case was a
full legal parent of the child. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass.
1999); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1999). Pointing out that the
doctrine applies to any person who meets the criteria, each court arrived
at a similar, carefully crafted set of standards for determining functional
parenthood-standards that most active parents should be able to meet.
Taylor Flynn is an assistant professor at Northeastern University
Law School. She was formerly a lawyer for the American Civil Liberties
Union of Southern California, where she litigated several transgender
rights cases.