Race, Crime and the Law
"Race is important." At least in this instance, Professor Randall Kennedy
of Harvard Law School is unequivocal in his treatise, Race, Crime, and the
Law (Pantheon, 1997, 390 pages, $30).
In this well-written and thought-out text, Kennedy explores issues that include
unequal protection and unequal enforcement in the context of race, the death
penalty, and the issue of race in a criminal trial.
As would be expected from a law professor, much case law is examined. Kennedy
discusses each supporting case and distinguishes one related case from another.
Kennedy sets forth several reforms, including "prohibiting officers (except
in absolutely extraordinary circumstances) from using race as a proxy for
increased risk of criminality." Then, the author maintains that "except in
the narrow instance of an emergency, courts should prohibit officials from
drawing racial distinctions between persons."
Kennedy urges courts "to eschew the use of racial criteria for jury selection,
even when the purpose of so doing is putatively inclusionary' rather
than exclusionary.'" Finally, the author recommends that peremptory
challenges in jury selection be abolished, alleging that this type of challenge
really involves racial motives.
While Kennedy's stance on capital punishment is well articulated, it is misplaced
within the context of Race, Crime, and the Law. While he does not "regard
capital punishment as unconstitutional per se," he expresses "anxiety over
the risk of error." He buries these ideas in a footnote (as he does many
of his other thoughts); at least as far as capital punishment is concerned,
these ideas should be displayed prominently within the text.
While I give Race, Crime, and the Law good marks overall, there are some
shortcomings which should be mentioned. First, especially in the first half
of the book, Kennedy makes a point, he then refers to future pages in the
book. While my interest was initially piqued, I found it more distracting
and annoying.
Kennedy devotes only a page to a discussion of Bernhard Goetz, the man who
shot four black panhandlers in a New York City subway, pleaded self-defense,
and was acquitted (although was convicted on a "gun possession charge").
While, in comparison, the O.J. Simpson murder case is accorded reams of space.
Probably the most serious problem is Kennedy's hedging on various points.
At one point in the text, Kennedy writes, "Appealing to racial sentiments
in a criminal proceeding is virtually always morally and legally wrong. .
. ." Buried in a footnote on the very next page appears to be the opposite
side of the coin: "I decline to say that appealing to racial sentiments is
always morally wrong only because I think that every principle has limits
. . . that there are virtually no absolutes."
Racial questions are an imbroglio of hotly contested ideas, and in Race,
Crime, and the Law, Kennedy, on the whole, handles this volatile mixture
well.
Sensible Justice: Alternatives to Prison
"Nobody has ever benefitted from doing prison time for selling crack on the
street." Though there are some of a conservative political persuasion who
might take issue with this statement, this theme is integral to the ideas
set forth by David C. Anderson in Sensible Justice: Alternatives to
Prison, (The New Press, 1998, 160 pages, $23.85).
In Sensible Justice, the author lists and discusses, by chapter and in ascending
order of severity, alternatives to prison for nonviolent offenders. These
include community service, intensive supervision, probation and house arrest,
day reporting, residential restitution, and boot camps.
It's a fast-paced, easy read. Anderson is obsessed with the notion of
cost-effective punishment. Granted, cost savings are important, but Anderson
fails to address what harms, either psychological and/or economic, might
be placed on the victims. Don't the innocent in our society also have rights?
It's a question worth investigating.
Still, with the terrible problems in today's prisons, any alternative cannot
be ignored.
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