
We extend special
thanks to Robyn S. Shapiro, Human Rights editorial board member, for
her assistance as special issue editor of this edition discussing body
rights and body ethics.
Introduction
Bodily Integrity and Informed Choice in Times of War and Terror
By George J. Annas
Law is the dominant
force behind American medical ethics, and has been for at least the
past half-century. That lawyers and judges, rather than physicians,
have set the agenda for medical ethics in the United States is a bit
surprising to many in the field of medical ethics, but it should not
be. Medicine has historically been based on paternalism. The Hippocratic
physician was obligated to act in the best interests of the patient-as
the physician judged those interests-and to "do no harm."
American law, on the other hand, is based on liberty and justice, principles
that, among other things, led to the law's adoption of the doctrine
of informed consent-better termed informed choice-under which individuals
make the ultimate decision about what, if anything, will be done to
their bodies. All of the articles in this issue make that central point
from a remarkable variety of perspectives.
The question of
when the law assumed the dominant role in defining ethical medical practice
can be debated, but my nomination is at the "Doctors' Trial"
at Nuremberg. The end of World War II was marked by the birth of the
international human rights movement, the formation of the United Nations,
and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The "Doctors'
Trial" was an important piece of this picture. U.S. judges, presiding
under military jurisdiction in Nuremberg, Germany, found fifteen Nazi
physicians guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for their
actions in conducting or authorizing lethal and torturous medical experiments
on concentration camp inmates. More importantly, the court articulated
what has come to be called the Nuremberg Code, which sets forth the
legal requirements for human experimentation. The most significant provision
is the first of ten: "The voluntary consent of the human subject
is absolutely essential . . . the person involved should have the legal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise
free power of choice, without intervention of any element of force,
fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension
of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make
an understanding and enlightened decision. . . "
The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares bodily integrity central
to both human rights and human dignity, providing in Article 5, for
example, that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Most physicians,
of course, do not view human experimentation as torture, but the treaty
that followed the declaration, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, made the link unmistakable by adding an additional
sentence to the UDHR's Article 5 in its Article 7: "No one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." This is,
of course, now a fundamental precept of international human rights law.
Moreover, under the treaty, Article 7 is nonderogable, even "in
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation."
In the United States,
our courts later adopted and applied the doctrine of informed consent
to the therapeutic as well as the research setting, reversing the Hippocratic
ethic by placing choice in the hands of patients rather than physicians.
As pivotal as the doctrine of informed choice is now to both law and
medical ethics, its application in some circumstances remains contested,
as Robyn S. Shapiro discusses in her overview of the controversy surrounding
the payment of living donors for solid organs. Lawyers continue to be
called upon to advocate for their clients whose right to bodily integrity
has been ignored or abused. Moreover, physicians sometimes have affirmative
obligations to act to help their patients that reliance on informed
consent alone cannot resolve. Kathryn L. Tucker, for example, accurately
describes the epidemic of untreated pain as a "human rights tragedy."
She could as accurately have described physicians' failure to treat
their patients' pain and suffering as torture. It is a scandal that
the medical profession ignores such widespread suffering, and it will
likely take vigorous legal action to change medical practice in this
realm. Similarly, Shawna L. Parks correctly notes that institutionalizing
juvenile offenders should require that they be provided basic mental
health care. Susan Berke Fogel and Lourdes A. Rivera demonstrate how
religious guidelines can frustrate and prevent good medical care, and
why lawyers should insist that when the two are in conflict, "the
medical needs of the patient must prevail."
Looking at informed
consent directly, Stephen F. Hanlon and Robyn S. Shapiro argue persuasively
that there is more at stake in human experimentation than physical injury:
such experimentation without consent is also an affront to human dignity,
and courts should recognize a dignitary harm even in the absence of
physical harm when informed consent is not obtained. The Nazis showed
us the extreme physicians could go to in the service of the state. Kathy
Swedlow helps us understand that when physicians act as agents of the
state to involuntarily medicate a death row inmate so that person (certainly
not a "patient") can be executed, the drugging can meet neither
the legal requirement of informed consent nor the Hippocratic injunction
to "do no harm." And Thomas May reminds us that soldiers are
people too. Although soldiers may relinquish their right to refuse medical
treatment upon enlisting, they retain, as all humans do, their right
to refuse to be subjects of human experiments-and so retain their right
to refuse experimental or investigational drugs and vaccines, even in
wartime. The Nuremberg Code is, after all, a wartime document and made
no exceptions for informed consent for either war or the soldiers assigned
to fight it.
It should go without
saying (but, of course, it doesn't) that civilians retain all of their
rights to bodily integrity, even during war and times of domestic emergencies,
and that under no circumstances should civilians be subjected to forced
vaccination or other bodily invasions-even those deemed "necessary"
by military, medical, or public health officials. Human rights lawyers
should resist current proposals to grant public health officials the
power over the bodies of civilians during a bioterrorist attack or other
public emergency. Such proposals are not only destructive of basic human
rights, they are counterproductive in that they replace a medical and
public health system based on truthful communication and trust with
one based on fear and arbitrary power. Terrorism by others is no excuse
for torture by us.
George J. Annas
is Professor of Health Law at Boston University School of Public Health,
School of Medicine, and School of Law, and cofounder of Global Lawyers
and Physicians.