Reining in the Neutral Reportage Privilege
by James E. Stewart and Laurie J. Michelson
In Time v. Pape,1 the U.S. Supreme Court observed that much of what the
press reports “purports to be descriptive of what somebody said rather than of what
anybody did.”2 But what happens when the media suspects-or even knows-that
what is being said is not true? For example, a vociferous, prominent opponent of assisted
suicide claims that Jack Kevorkian has assisted in the death of people whom Kevorkian and
the patient’s family thought should be euthanized, even though the
“patient” had not expressed a desire to die. Or the situation posed by Robert
Sack and Sandra Baron: a senator widely believed to be an undeclared candidate for
president holds a press conference stating that his competitor for the nomination, an
unmarried woman with a staunch pro-life position, has herself had an abortion.3
Courts and commentators have grappled with the issue of whether and when the media should
be held liable for defamation when they know or suspect that such newsworthy charges are
false, but publish them anyway.
Under the common law, one who republishes a defamatory statement is liable in equal
measure to the original defamer.4 Liability, however, is not automatic. For
example, such reporting frequently occurs within the context of a vigorous public debate,
where both sides are given their full say, and neither wishes to antagonize the media.
Additionally, if the republished statement comes directly from a public record, public
proceeding, or a public official’s statement (such as a press conference), many
states have adopted fair report privileges that protect the republication.5 The
Supreme Court has similarly ruled that reports on the contents of public proceedings and
records are protected by an absolute privilege as a matter of federal constitutional law.6
Finally, numerous states, including Michigan, have adopted statutes that protect
broadcasters from liability for any “defamatory statement published or uttered . . .
by one other than [the] owner, licensee or operator, or agent, or employee” of the
broadcasting station.7
In addition to these privileges, the Second Circuit in 1977 introduced a new phrase
into the lexicon,"neutral reportage," to further address the problem, or at
least some permutations of the problem, of repeating an allegedly defamatory charge.8 In Edwards
v. National Audubon Society, the New York Times had accurately reported charges
by the National Audubon Society that prominent scientists supporting the use of the
insecticide DDT were "paid liars." The Second Circuit dismissed the
scientists’ defamation suit against the Times, holding that "we must
provide immunity from defamation suits where the journalist believes, reasonably and in
good faith, that his report accurately conveys the charges made."9 The court
announced the neutral reportage privilege in the following statement:
Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent organization like the
National Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First
Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless
of the reporter’s private views regarding their validity. . . . What is newsworthy
about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe that the press may be
required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely because it has
serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take out cudgels against dubious
charges in order to publish them without fear of liability for defamation. . . . The
public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often rage around
sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such charges
without assuming responsibility for them.10
The privilege recognizes that, if the First Amendment is indeed designed to facilitate
dissemination of information to the public, it ought to protect press dissemination of
newsworthy statements by others, at least if they are "prominent and
responsible," regardless of their underlying truth. The subjects of such news reports
retain a viable remedy against the original speaker, so there is less legitimate state
interest in permitting damage awards against news organizations for republishing the
statements.11
The decision in Edwards spawned a flurry of commentary. Some have argued that
the privilege is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
Others endorse the privilege and concept, but have widely varying positions about how it
should be defined and applied.12 The courts that have wrestled with neutral reportage
following Edwards have similarly been divided. In some jurisdictions, the courts
have rejected neutral reportage on the grounds that "the press is adequately
protected by the burden of proof required by Sullivan."13 Other jurisdictions
have embraced the privilege, either as set forth in Edwards or with various changes
to the Edwards elements.14 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. In Harte-Hanks
Communications v. Connaughton,15 although the Court declined to address the
issue, Justice Blackman, in a concurring opinion, observed that the newspaper’s
decision to abandon the neutral reportage defense was "unwise" because
"[w]ere this Court to adopt the neutral reportage theory, the facts of this case
arguably might fit within it."16 The following year the Court did not mention neutral
reportage in Milkovich v. Lorraine Journal.17 However, the Court’s refusal to
carve out an absolute First Amendment privilege for assertions of opinion—because
"the breathing space that freedoms of expression require to survive is adequately
secured by existing constitutional doctrine"—suggests that the current Court
might not be inclined to create a separate constitutional privilege for neutral reportage.
With or without the Court’s blessing, the privilege exists and has repeatedly been
raised as a defense by the media since its official articulation in Edwards. In
attempting to define the parameters of the neutral reportage privilege following Edwards,
the courts have settled primarily on the following core elements:
[F]irst, the report of the charges must be "neutral," i.e.,
accurately and disinterestedly republished;
[S]econd, the charges must have been made by a responsible and prominent speaker;
[T]hird, the subject of the charges must be a public figure; and
[F]ourth, the charges must be newsworthy.18
These elements have been justified as follows:
The first requirement, that the report must be neutral and accurate,
ensures that the Constitution will not protect the media’s veiled attempts at
launching its own defamatory attacks under the guise of informing the public of important
controversies. The requirement that the charges be made by a prominent and responsible
speaker increases the likelihood that the accusations are true and, if false, at least
limits the privilege to speech that the public has a strong interest in hearing. Limiting
the privilege to accusations against public figures serves to foster debate on important
public issues, as attacks on the reputations of public figures often involve issues in
which the public has a strong interest. Finally, the requirement that the charges must be
newsworthy also attempts to limit the privilege to charges in the context of public debate
that the public should be informed about, even if false.19
In the early years following Edwards, as the acceptance of the privilege
expanded, so too did the parameters of the Edwards elements:
The evolution in neutral reportage jurisprudence over the last few years
has occurred through a significant broadening of the contours of the privilege. A
broadening of the privilege has taken place through relaxation of the requirement that the
privilege be granted only when the person defamed is a public figure, relaxation of the
requirement that the defamatory statement come from a "responsible, prominent"
source, and relaxation of the standard for the neutrality of the report.20
In the last five to six years, however, although court decisions have not provided an
overwhelming volume of authority regarding the neutral reportage doctrine, there appears
to be a reversal of the trend and more questions concerning its continued expansion. This
article will briefly examine the ways in which the Edwards elements were initially
expanded and will then analyze recent cases to illustrate the ways in which courts appear
to be moving back to a stricter interpretation of Edwards.
Expansion of the Edwards Elements
Among the significant factors in Edwards was the fact that the published charges
were levied by the National Audubon Society, which was considered a responsible, prominent
organization. However, this prerequisite to the application of the privilege was quickly
expanded and has been applied, for example, to individuals in addition to organizations.21
Similarly, in Barry v. Time, Inc.,22 the court broadened the
"prominence" requirement to cover all situations in which the speaker’s
identity is known. Thus, the court applied the privilege to a neutral and accurate
publication of the accusations of a professional basketball player and convicted felon
against his former basketball coach over alleged NCAA rule violations.23 The court held
that the neutral reportage privilege should not turn on the "trustworthiness" of
the individual or organization making the defamatory statements, since this would require
the media to be the "arbiters" of a source’s trustworthiness.24
The Edwards court also was careful to distinguish neutral reports from instances
of "advocacy journalism" in which the reporter adopts, rather than merely
reports, the defamatory charges of others. In Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.,25 the
Eighth Circuit removed this restriction, permitting a writer to express his personal views
about the reported matter, i.e., about criticisms leveled against an FBI agent for his
role in investigating the Wounded Knee occupation and a shoot-out on the Indian
reservation during which two FBI agents were killed. In addition, at least one federal
court has held that Edwards does not require the reporter to seek a response from
the person allegedly defamed to qualify for the "neutral" elements of the
privilege.26
Lastly, the Edwards court applied the privilege to charges made against a public
figure. Following Edwards, however, several courts have applied the privilege in
cases involving nonprominent plaintiffs.27
As the Third Circuit noted in a neutral reportage case in 1981, courts have, "as a
matter of federal law, expressed a reluctance to hold the press responsible for
publication of defamatory statements originally uttered by others."28 Although this
reluctance may still exist, several recently decided cases suggest that, where courts
desire to protect defendants from liability, they are doing so either without relying upon
the neutral reportage privilege or by applying the privilege in a manner that more
strictly adheres to the elements initially established in Edwards.
Limiting the Application of the Neutral Reportage Privilege
In Trujillo v. Banco Central,29 the plaintiffs owned interests in several banks.
The defendant Banco Central Del Ecuador is the central bank of Ecuador, and defendant
Conover is a public relations firm that on behalf of the defendant bank issued a press
release to government and news agencies in the United States that allegedly defamed the
plaintiffs. Conover argued that the press release was protected by the neutral reportage
privilege.
The court disagreed, concluding that the "neutral reporting privilege is only
extended to ‘disinterested and neutral reporting’ by members of the media."30
The court said:
Conover does not qualify as news media, and it is neither disinterested
nor neutral insofar as events relating to Banco Central are concerned. . . . Thus, the
complaint alleges the press release to be a non-media, partisan attack which misconstrued
government action, rather than a neutral media report of government-disseminated
information. If this is established at trial [the neutral reporting] privilege would be
[inapplicable].31
Thus, even though a press release would seem to generate the type of public discourse
and debate that the neutral reportage privilege is interested in encouraging, at least one
court has restricted application of the privilege to republishers that are members of the
media. At least in Trujillo, the court found that a press release by a public
relations firm on behalf of a client is not neutral and disinterested.
In Englezos v. News Press and Gazette Company,32 the court likewise rejected the
privilege on the grounds that the reporting at issue was not neutral. In Englezos,
the local newspaper in Buchanan County, Missouri, reported that the plaintiff was stopped
by the county sheriff after stealing possessions from the restaurant where the plaintiff
worked. In response to defendants’ request to dismiss the complaint, the court noted
that Missouri has never adopted the neutral reportage doctrine. The court found, however,
that even if Missouri did recognize this type of privilege and did apply it to private
figures:
[L]arge portions of the article in question clearly went beyond the
bounds of neutral reportage. The article simply did not accurately report allegations on
matters of public concern. It offered the reporter’s comment that the restaurant
appeared to have "died an ugly death," stating as fact that Mr. Englezos
"tried to leave town in a rented truck full of equipment and supplies belonging to
the restaurant" . . . inaccurately reporting that a sheriff’s deputy allegedly
prevented Mr. Englezos from leaving town . . . and so forth. This is not neutral reportage
of accusations made by others. It does not come within the claimed privilege for neutral
reportage, even assuming Missouri will recognize that privilege in an appropriate case.33
Not surprisingly, courts are once again recognizing that the threshold requirement for
the application of a "neutral reportage" privilege is that the report actually
be neutral. As is the case with the fair report privilege, media defendants must strive to
be fair and accurate in summarizing the charges that are being republished; any
interpretations or embellishments may potentially jeopardize application of the neutral
reportage privilege.
Also not surprisingly, competent plaintiff’s counsel often can successfully draft
a complaint so as to avoid summary dismissal of a defamation claim by alleging facts that
negate application of the neutral reportage protection, at least as a matter of law. For
example, in RRZ Public Markets, Inc. v. Bond Buyer,34 the defendant Bond Buyer
reported allegations by a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice (himself facing disciplinary
proceedings for misconduct) that a fellow Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Zappala, was
under federal investigation for receiving kickbacks through layered corporations in
exchange for steering bond business to his brother, the chairman of the plaintiff RRZ. In
response to a defamation action by RRZ, defendants sought to have the complaint dismissed
on the grounds that its report was protected by the neutral reportage privilege.
The court reiterated that the neutral reportage privilege only protects a
newspaper’s accurate and disinterested republication of accusations against a public
figure in controversies in the public interest. The court then denied the defendant’s
12(b)(6) motion because, accepting all of plaintiff’s allegations as true, "the
claim that defendants did not accurately report the [Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice’s] charges is sufficient . . . to withstand the claim of privileged neutral
reportage."35
The issue of the reporter’s neutrality was also pivotal is Levin v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.36 In Levin, the plaintiff alleged that he was libeled by
statements made in a book entitled The Ransom of Russian Art, published by
defendant Farrar and excerpted in an article published by the New Yorker. According
to the plaintiff, portions of the book and the article pertaining to the mysterious death
of a noted Russian dissident artist charged plaintiff with cowardice and with involvement
in the death of the artist and the artist’s friend. The defendant sought dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that the book was protected by the neutral reportage
privilege.
The court declined to apply the privilege, concluding that none of the Edwards
elements were satisfied. First, the court found that the individuals who supplied the
information about the plaintiff were not "responsible, prominent organizations"
or otherwise comparable to the National Audubon Society, whose allegations in themselves
would be newsworthy.37 Additionally, the court found that Edwards protected only
reporting of newsworthy controversies, as distinguished from situations in which the
reporter elicits the defamatory statement, particularly where the events are temporally
remote.38 Thus, the court stated:
In this case, the various versions were elicited by McPhee and related
to events that took place in 1976, 18 years prior to the publication of McPhee’s book
and article. In these circumstances, [the Russian artist’s] death cannot be deemed a
"raging controversy" at least on the basis of the limited record now before the
court. The court therefore declines to resolve the matter on the basis of Edwards at this
stage of the proceedings.39
Similarly, in Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enterprises, Inc.,40 the court likewise
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss because, taking the factual allegations of
plaintiff’s complaint as true, the court could not state as a matter of law that the
neutral reportage doctrine applied. In particular, the court held that the plaintiff had
adequately pled that the republished accusations, e.g., that a court had found plaintiff
negligent in a libel case, were not neutrally and accurately reported by the defendants.41
Privilege Mooted Where Other Grounds Apply
In a few recent opinions, courts have declined to adopt or expand the neutral reportage
privilege in situations where the fair report privilege might have been applicable, but
where other grounds existed for the courts’ ruling.
For instance, in Chapin v. Philadelphia Inquirer,42 one of plaintiff’s
charities sponsored a program to send "gift packs" to American soldiers in Saudi
Arabia during Desert Storm. For the payment of $15, a contributor could send a gift pack
of snacks to a particular soldier. The Philadelphia Inquirer published a story
questioning the program’s finances and the hefty mark-up between the wholesale cost
of the items in the gift pack and the price charged the public. The article contained a
statement by a California congressman questioning the cost of the gift packs. The
newspaper claimed that this statement was protected by the neutral reportage privilege.
The Chapin court noted that, while the Second Circuit has expanded the fair
report privilege into a more general neutral reportage privilege, the Fourth Circuit has
not adopted or rejected the neutral reportage privilege. The Fourth Circuit has, however,
applied the fair report privilege. Thus, the court remarked that:
[u]ntil we face a case with a prominent, responsible, but
nongovernmental speaker, we need not cast our lot one way or the other on the full Edwards
neutral reportage privilege. We think that a fair and accurate report of the public
remarks of a member of Congress fits within the fair report privilege as we recognized it
in Reuber [v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F2d 703 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
2814 (1991)].43
Similarly, in White v. Fraternal Order of Police,44 the Fraternal Order of
Police (FOP) published statements about a controversy generated when the plaintiff
underwent a routine drug test required for his promotion from lieutenant to captain. Among
other things, the FOP published the fact that White’s first urine sample initially
tested positive for marijuana and that a second urine sample, which was taken and
transported under irregular circumstances, tested negative. The Washington Post
published a series of articles concerning the FOP’s allegations of wrongdoing
surrounding the drug test. The local NBC affiliate also broadcast a report regarding
White’s drug test. The court found that the media reports were fair and accurate
summaries of the contents of the FOP’s letters, which were the subject of
governmental proceedings, and were therefore protected by the fair report privilege. In
declining to apply the neutral reportage privilege, the court observed:
The media defendants also claimed the right under the First Amendment to
report accurately allegations of wrongdoing in a matter of public interest, even where the
allegations are made outside of an official proceeding. The premise of this privilege,
they claim, is that accusations of malfeasance by public officials are newsworthy, and the
public will only learn of such charges if the press is immune from liability for
dispassionate and disinterested reporting of such allegations. While the Second Circuit
has recognized a Constitutional privilege of neutral reportage, see Edwards, this Circuit
has not. Because we need not reach this question in order to resolve this case, we
declined to do so. . . . We doubt that even if the neutral reportage privilege were
recognized by this court, NBC would not likely be able to invoke such privilege because
its report does not attribute the facts to allegations made by the FOP.45
Thus, in situations where the more well-established and accepted fair report privilege
applies, courts appear to be reluctant to also adopt a neutral reportage privilege.
Privilege Not Extended to Private Figures
In Khawar v. Globe International, Inc.,46 the Supreme Court of California
recently held that the neutral reportage privilege does not extend to publications
concerning private figures. This libel case arose out of a Globe article about a
book by a conspiracy theorist regarding Robert F. Kennedy’s assassination. The
article was taken from the contents of the book and conversations that the reporter had
with the book’s author. In the book and the article, the authors contend that Kennedy
was not killed by Sirhan Sirhan but by an Iranian assassin named Ali Ahmand, and support
this assertion with a picture of the plaintiff on the podium near Kennedy on the night of
his assassination. The plaintiff was, at the time, a freelance photo journalist covering
the 1968 presidential race.
The Globe argued that, because the article concerns allegations made in a public
book, it should be protected under the neutral reportage privilege. The court ruled that
the plaintiff was not a limited purpose public figure simply because he was on the stage
near Kennedy on the night that Kennedy was shot and gave a television interview refuting
the charges in the article after it was published.47 The court then refused to embrace the
neutral reportage privilege in cases where the injured plaintiff is a private figure.48
The court reasoned that a balance must be struck between the First Amendment’s
protection of news reporting and the protection of the reputation of a private person.49
The California Supreme Court reiterated that a reasonable degree of protection for a
private individual’s reputation is essential to our system of ordered liberty.50
Thus, it would appear that, at least in California, there has been a significant
curtailment of Edwards and the neutral reportage privilege where the plaintiff is
not a public figure or official, even where the accusations were neutrally reported,
newsworthy, and concern a matter of public interest or concern.51
Strict Application of the Edwards Elements
In one of the few federal cases to apply the privilege in the last five years, the
Southern District of New York took the opportunity to note that the privilege should be
limited. In Coliniatis v. National Herald,52 the libel plaintiff was an executive
of Olympic Airways, the government-owned national airline of Greece. The National
Herald obtained a copy of a letter from Olympic Airways’ law firm claiming that
the plaintiff was involved in a possible kickback scheme and published a number of
statements from the letter.
The National Herald sought dismissal of plaintiff’s defamation claims on
the ground that its article was protected by the neutral reportage privilege. The court
first noted that the Edwards privilege had been limited to instances where the
defendant publishes an allegedly defamatory statement (1) in the context of an accurate
and disinterested report; (2) regarding a newsworthy controversy; (3) in which the
defamatory statement is made by a responsible, prominent organization; and (4) provided
that the statement is not endorsed by the publisher.53 The court then continued:
In light of the potential publication of the baseless allegations
proffered by others, the Second Circuit has noted the need to circumscribe the breadth of
the neutral reportage privilege. Accordingly, the court has placed clear limits on the
reach of the privilege, stating: It is equally clear . . . that the publisher who in fact
espouses or concurs in the charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts those
statements to launch a personal attack of his own on a public figure, cannot rely on a
privilege of neutral reportage.54
Strictly applying the Edwards elements to the facts before it, the court found
that the article was protected by the neutral reportage doctrine. Specifically, the court
held that the article was accurate and disinterested, that there was no evidence that the National
Herald subscribed to any of the charges in the letter or distorted the allegations of
the letter in any way, and that Olympic’s law firm was a responsible, prominent,
organization within the meaning of Edwards. This last element was particularly
important to the court, as it acts as a proxy for determining when the very fact that
allegations are made is itself newsworthy as well as an indication that a report is likely
to be reliable to ensure that an irresponsible republisher of unsupported allegations
cannot hide behind the aegis of the privilege.55
Conclusion
Although there has not been a wealth of additional authority outlining the contours of
the neutral reportage doctrine in the last five years, courts appear to be continuing to
struggle with its scope and parameters. If such a relatively small number of cases can
provide the basis for any sort of extrapolation, it appears that courts are strictly
adhering to the Edwards factors in determining whether to apply the privilege or,
when possible, avoiding the matter altogether by relying upon other, more widely accepted
privileges.
Endnotes
1. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
2. Id. at 285-86.
3. See Robert Sack and Sandra Baron, Libel, Slander and Related Problems, §
6.3.2.4.2 at p. 392.
4. See Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 578, 581A.
5. See id. § 611. A listing of the states that have codified the privilege can be
found in Charles L. Babcock and Cami Dawson Boyd, Can Suspects Sue the Media for
Coverage of Investigations?, 15 Communications Law. 2, at p. 3, n.18 (1997), and Weiss
and Neuhardt, Recent Developments in the Law of Defamation, 540 PLI/Pat 7.
6. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1974).
7. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 484.331. Numerous other states have similar
privileges. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-652 (Arizona); Cal. Civ. Code.
§ 48.5 (California); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-106 (Colorado); Fla. Stat. § 770.04
(Florida); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231 § 91A (Massachusetts); New York Civ. Prac. L. & R.
§ 75 (New York); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2739.03 (Ohio); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
73.004 (Texas).
8. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977).
9. Id. at 120.
10. Id.
11. Sanford, Libel & Privacy § 6.5.
12. See Khawar v. Globe Int’l, Inc., 26 Media L. Rep. 2505, 2513, n.3 (Cal.
1998), for a listing of some of the extensive literature on neutral reportage. See also
Floyd Abrams, With Edwards, the Second Circuit is a step ahead of the Supreme
Court - not always a safe place to be— First Amendment in the Second Circuit:
Reflections on Edwards v. National Audubon Society, The Past and The Future, 65
St. John’s L. Rev. 731, 741 (1991).
13. Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608 (1982). The privilege has also
been rejected in the following cases: McCall v. Courier Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep.
1789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875 (S.D. 1985); Tunney v.
American Broadcasting Cos.,1 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. App. 1982); Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583 F.2d
1221 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Young v. Morning Journal, 25 Media L. Rep. 1024 (Ohio
1996) (declining to recognize the privilege).
14. See, e.g., Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Price v.
Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036
(1990); In re United Press Int’l, 16 Media L. Rep. 2401 (D.D.C. 1989); April
v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio App. 1988); Kraus v. Champaign News
Gazette, 375 N.E.2d 1362 (Ill. App. 1982); Gist v. Decatur Herald and Review, 671 N.E.2d
1154 (Ill. App. 1996). It is interesting to note the internal division and confusion
within some jurisdictions. In Ohio and Illinois, some appellate panels have recognized the
privilege, see April, 546 N.E.2d at 466; Kraus, 375 N.E.2d at 1362,
while others have not, see, e.g., Young, 25 Media L. Rep. at 1024; Tunney,
441 N.E.2d at 86. In New York, the birth place of Edwards, the state courts are
divided. Compare Orr v. Lunch, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep’t), aff’d,
45 N.Y.S.2d 903 (endorsing doctrine), with Hogan v. Herald Co., 8 Media L. Rep.
1137 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d, 8 Media L. Rep. 2567 (N.Y. App. 1982) (rejecting
doctrine).
15. 591 U.S. 657 (1989).
16. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 695.
17. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
18. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 12.
19. J. Wertman, The Newsworthiness Requirement of the Privilege of Neutral Reportage Is
a Matter of Public Concern, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 790 (1996).
20. S. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. L. Rev.
417 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Disalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 544 A.2d 1345, 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (A reporter is privileged to publish the serious charges of a responsible, prominent
entity (either an organization or individual, as there is no reason to believe the Edwards
court intended a distinction)).
22. 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
23. Id.
24. Id. See also McBride v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 1252
(D.D.C. 1982) (suggesting that the privilege should apply whenever the charges are made by
any public official).
25. 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
26. See In re United Press Int’l, 16 Media L. Rep. 2401(D.D.C. 1989).
27. See, e.g., Horvath v. Ashtabula, 8 Media L. Rep. 1657 (Ohio App. 1982) (neutral
reportage doctrine applies to private plaintiffs); Kraus, 375 N.E. 2d at 1362
(privilege applies to statements regarding all public issues, regardless of whether the
defamed was a public figure).
28. Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).
29. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
30. Id. at 1338 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 1337-38.
32. 27 Media L. Rep. 1161 (Mo. App. 1998).
33. Id. at 1167.
34. 3 Media L. Rep. 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
35. Id.
36. 917 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
37. Id. at 239.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2107 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
41. Id. at *7.
42. 21 Media L. Rep. 1449 (4th Cir. 1993).
43. Id.
44. 17 Media L. Rep. 2137 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 2150.
46. 26 Media L. Rep. 2505 (Cal. 1998).
47. Khawar, 26 Media L. Rep. at 2509-10.
48. Id. at 2514.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2514-15.
51. By contrast in Ohio, one court has stated: We see no legitimate difference between the
press’s accurate reporting of accusations made against a private figure and those
made against a public figure, when the accusations themselves are newsworthy and concern a
matter of public interest. April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio App.
1988).
52. 965 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
53. Id. at 519 (citing Edwards).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 520.