The Constitutionality of the Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act
by Robert C. Lind and Natalie B. Eckart
Robert C. Lind is a professor of law at Southwestern University School of Law and
coauthor of Newsgathering and the Law (1997 & 1998 Supp.). Natalie B. Eckart is
a third-year student at Southwestern University School of Law.
The ongoing debate regarding access to and use of personal information is currently
focused on information contained in motor vehicle records. Privacy advocates point to the
loss of individual control over one’s personal information, as well as to the
physical dangers and intrusions made available by the dissemination of such information.
State governments, with an interest in protecting a profitable revenue stream, point to
the income derived from the sale or licensing of such basic information to businesses,
charities, and political organizations. Members of the media point to the general policy
of public access to public records such as motor vehicle records,1 as well as
to investigative tools that are made available by the disclosure of such information.
The federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)2 has enhanced
individual privacy protection by limiting states’ abilities to release personal
information contained in motor vehicle records. The Act conflicts with several
states’ public records laws and constrains the ability of reporters to obtain useful
information that may be helpful in investigating important issues. Four federal courts of
appeal have analyzed the DPPA and are equally divided as to its constitutionality.3
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in the case of Condon v. Reno,4
a Fourth Circuit decision that found the DPPA to be unconstitutional.
The underlying policy question at the heart of the DPPA controversy is whether a state
has the right to open its motor vehicle records to the public and press, and the right to
commercially exploit the information contained in those records, or whether that decision
can be prohibited by congressional concern for the abuses of some who have access to such
records. The privacy interest of a state’s citizens may be protected under the
state’s public records laws, but many states have decided that the revenue gained
through sale of its motor vehicle databases is more valuable than the interests of
licensed drivers. With the enactment of the DPPA, Congress decided that the privacy
interests of all citizens deserve protection and acted to limit the unauthorized
exploitation of private information by states. The issue now before the courts, and one
that will be decided by the Supreme Court next session, is whether the federal government
can make that choice for the states.
The regulation of drivers and their records has traditionally been viewed as a matter
of state and local concern.5 Motor vehicle documents, such as driver’s
license applications, driver’s licenses, vehicle titles, vehicle licenses, and
driver’s records, are generally considered public records that must be disclosed
pursuant to state public records laws.6 The public has traditionally been
accorded full access to motor vehicle information.7
At the time of enactment of the DPPA, thirty-four states allowed public access to motor
vehicle records. With the advent of modern data processing technology that permits the
aggregation of pieces of personal information into large central data banks, some states
became more restrictive in their policies concerning the release of motor vehicle
information, especially to commercial vendors. As a general rule, however, names and
addresses contained in motor vehicle records were released by states.8 Personal
information falling within statutory exemptions or limitations were redacted from the
requested record.9 Information relating to medical history, age, height, or
Social Security number were often deemed unwarranted invasions of personal privacy and
removed from documents before release.10 These privacy considerations had more
to do with concern for possible commercial fraud than for the physical well-being of
individual licensees.11
Although public access to motor vehicle records has many legitimate uses, certain
criminal or offensive uses of such records have come to the attention of federal
lawmakers. In 1989 actress Rebecca Schaeffer was killed by an obsessed fan. The fan was
able to locate Schaeffer’s home after he hired a private investigator who obtained
the actress’ address by accessing her California motor vehicle record, which was open
to public inspection. As a result, the state of California restricted the dissemination of
such information to specified recipients.12 In addition to the Schaeffer
murder, public access to personal information contained in motor vehicle records allowed
antiabortion groups to contact abortion clinic patients and criminals to obtain addresses
of owners of expensive automobiles. Reaction to these incidents led to enactment of the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act.
DPPA Provisions
The DPPA makes it unlawful for a state department of motor vehicles to "knowingly
disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity personal information13
about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle
record."14 The Act permits the disclosure of such information for limited
purposes such as government functions, law enforcement, safety, and product notifications.15
State departments of motor vehicles are permitted to disclose personal information for
other purposes only if the department provides "clear and conspicuous" notice on
its documents that such information may be disclosed, and the opportunity for individuals
to prohibit such disclosures.16 The state also has the ability to rent or sell
such information in bulk for purposes of surveys, marketing, and solicitations, but only
if individuals are provided an opportunity to prohibit the use of their information.17
The Act also restricts the manner in which third parties are permitted to use, sell, or
otherwise reuse personal information obtained pursuant to the DPPA’s exceptions.18
Any state department of motor vehicles "that has a policy or practice of
substantial noncompliance" with the Act is subject to a fine of up to $5,000 a day
for each day of substantial noncompliance.19 Persons who knowingly violate the
Act are subject to criminal fines.20 An individual whose personal information
has been used in violation of the Act is entitled to bring a civil action against the
person who knowingly obtained, disclosed, or used the information.21 Remedies
established by the Act include a minimum of $2,500 in actual damages, punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs.22
Enforcement
The DPPA took effect in most states in 1997. A majority of states have complied with
the Act by providing drivers with the ability to request that the state’s department
of motor vehicles keep their personal information confidential.23 Other states
have made such information exempt from disclosure.24 A few states have exempted
journalists from these restrictions.25
Some states have additionally increased drivers’ privacy by curtailing the sale of
personal information contained in driver’s, vehicle, or title lists for commercial
solicitation purposes.26 Others have continued to seek the revenue derived from
the sale of such records; Wisconsin annually derives approximately $8 million from the
sale of its motor vehicle licensing records for mailing lists.27
Four states (Alabama, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin) have challenged the
constitutionality of the DPPA.28 The bases for these challenges are that the
Act unlawfully requires states to create and maintain a system to enforce an unfunded
federal mandate in violation of the Tenth Amendment’s protection of state sovereignty
and the Eleventh Amendment’s prohibition of suits against states or their officials.
Media organizations have also joined in some of these suits, claiming that the Act
violates the First Amendment rights of the press. The four federal courts of appeal that
have addressed these suits are evenly divided as to whether the DPPA is constitutional.29
Commerce Clause
In the face of these challenges, the United States has asserted that the DPPA is a
lawful exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In most of the
challenges to the DPPA , the states have not questioned the relationship of motor vehicle
records to interstate commerce.30 In Pryor v. Reno,31
however, the state of Alabama argued that the dissemination of motor vehicle information
is neither commerce nor an activity substantially affecting commerce.32 In
response, the Eleventh Circuit noted that it is "abundantly clear that trafficking in
data bases is an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."33
Nevertheless, the court stated it was sympathetic to the state’s argument, in light
of the fact that Congress had exempted from the reach of the Act virtually all of the
commercial aspects of information dissemination that gave the Act its interstate
connections.34 The Eleventh Circuit did not rest its decision on a lack of
sufficient interstate commerce involvement, because it found a violation of the Tenth
Amendment even if interstate commerce were proved.35
Regardless of whether the activities regulated by the DPPA substantially affect
interstate commerce, the states have argued that congressional exercise of its Commerce
Clause power is constrained by the Tenth Amendment. The state claims that Congress may
subject state governments only to generally applicable laws36 and cannot enact
any law that directs the functioning of state executives or legislatures.37
Tenth Amendment Limitation
Litigation concerning the validity of the DPPA has focused on the constitutional
principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of undelegated powers
to the states. The Fourth Circuit addressed the ability of Congress to exercise its
Commerce Clause power against the states by analyzing two different lines of cases.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the first line of cases, following Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,38 permits Congress to enact laws of
general applicability that incidentally apply to state governments. Under this view,
Congress cannot regulate "states as states," and can subject states only to
legislation that is also applicable to private parties.39 Because motor vehicle
records are controlled only by the states, their disclosure cannot be regulated by
Congress.
In response to this line of cases, the United States has attempted to demonstrate that
the DPPA subjects the states to the same regulations regarding disclosure of personal
information to which Congress has subjected private parties, and is therefore
constitutional.40 The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits disagreed, finding that the
Act was not an attempt by Congress to regulate the disclosure of personal information
contained in all public and personal databases that applies only incidentally to state
motor vehicle records. In answer to the claim of the United States that the DPPA was one
of several statutes protecting against the dissemination of private information, the
courts found that congressional regulation of the disclosure of personal information by
selected businesses does not constitute the enactment of a general statute regulating the
disclosure of personal information by all private parties.41 The DPPA was found
by the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits to regulate the disclosure of information contained in
state motor vehicle records, a regulation that applies only to states, not to private
entities.42 Therefore, the courts determined, the DPPA is not a law of general
applicability and is in violation of the Tenth Amendment.43 The Seventh and
Tenth Circuits dispute this reading of Supreme Court precedent, finding that Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence permits the direct regulation of state activity by Congress, even
when it requires some state legislative or administrative action to achieve compliance
with the federal regulation, so long as it does not commandeer state legislative and
administrative processes.44
A second line of cases, following New York v. United States45 and
Printz v. United States,46 prohibits Congress from enacting any law that
compels states to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program or that commands state
officials to implement or administer such a program. The fundamental harm recognized by
these decisions is that, when states are forced to administer federal programs democratic
accountability is threatened. States are accountable to their citizens for something
Congress has dictated, yet Congress remains insulated from the electoral ramifications of
its decision.47
In the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, the states also successfully relied on this line
of cases, arguing that the Act forces state officials to administer the DPPA, a federal
regulatory program, and therefore is unconstitutional.48 The Eleventh Circuit
determined that the DPPA is neither self-administering nor self-enforcing. The court held
that, under the Act, state officers must ensure that protected personal information is
disclosed only for the designated purposes listed in the Act; they must also review
requests for information to determine whether the request is for a permissible use. This
led the Eleventh Circuit to conclude that the DPPA is a federal regulatory program that
Congress has directed state officers to administer, in contravention of the Tenth
Amendment.49
The Tenth Circuit viewed the actions required of the states by the DPPA as much more
limited, pointing out that the Act does not require states to enact legislation nor
conscript state officials to regulate the activities of private third parties. The Tenth
Circuit viewed the DPPA as directly regulating the disclosure of personal information
contained in motor vehicle records by preempting contrary state law.50
"The DPPA simply requires states to make a choice, i.e. stop releasing personal
information from state motor vehicle records to the public, or release such information
consistent with the dictates of the DPPA."51 The Seventh Circuit agreed,
viewing the DPPA as a regulation of the states as owners of information databases, not in
their roles as governments.52 "Nothing in the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act interferes with states’ ability to license drivers and remove
dangerous ones from the road; it regulates external rather than internal uses of the
information."53 According to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, because
the DPPA is a regulation of state participation in the information marketplace, the states
can constitutionally be required to establish record-keeping and mechanisms to facilitate
compliance with the federal regulation.54 Therefore, the court found, the steps
a motor vehicle department is required to take by the Act to identify mandatory,
discretionary, and forbidden disclosures of information is not an unconstitutional
conscription of the motor vehicle department or its personnel.55
Fourteenth Amendment
The federal government also contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted according to
Congress’s power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.56
The United States asserts that the DPPA enforces the constitutionally protected right of
privacy of those individuals whose name, address, and telephone number appear in motor
vehicle records.57
This argument was rejected by the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits, which found that there
is no constitutional right to privacy with respect to such information.58 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit ruled that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the information contained in motor vehicle records.59 It found
that there is a reduced expectation of privacy in matters involved in "pervasive
schemes of regulation," such as vehicle licensing; that the same type of information
is available from numerous other sources, such as property tax records; that there is a
long history of treating motor vehicle records as public records to which the public has
had access; and that such information is commonly provided by an individual to private
parties when cashing a check, using a credit card, or purchasing alcohol.60 The
Seventh and Tenth Circuits found it unnecessary to address the Fourteenth Amendment issue.
Spending Clause
The Fourth Circuit noted that a possible alternative means of regulating the release of
this information would be to make the receipt of federal highway funds contingent on the
state’s acceptance of the DPPA provisions, pursuant to the Spending Clause. If such
were the case, the states’ Tenth Amendment argument would not be available. The court
noted, however, that privacy provisions of the DPPA may lack the required nexus to the
purpose of the federal spending.61
Eleventh Amendment
The states have also argued that the DPPA violates the Eleventh Amendment’s
dictate that states cannot be sued in federal court without their consent. In the Seventh
Circuit, the state of Wisconsin argued that the DPPA unconstitutionally allows federal
lawsuits to be brought against itself or against its employees, for whose monetary awards
under the Act the state would be responsible.62 The Seventh Circuit responded
that any action against the state for criminal and civil fines under the Act would be
brought by the United States, a cause of action not curtailed by the Eleventh Amendment.63
As to the private cause of action provisions of the Act, the Seventh Circuit pointed out
that the Act specifically excludes states and state agencies from those provisions.64
As to Wisconsin’s fear that the DPPA may permit a private cause of action against
state employees in their official capacities, thereby placing the state at monetary risk,
the Seventh Circuit read the provision as limiting suits to personal capacity actions,
thereby avoiding state involvement in such actions.65
First Amendment
Only one appellate decision has addressed the First Amendment issues involved in the
DPPA litigation. In Travis v. Reno,66 the original plaintiffs argued
that the DPPA violated the First Amendment, by limiting their access to information in
public records. The Seventh Circuit in that case held that the Act did not violate the
First Amendment on its face, finding that there is no constitutional right to have access
to particular government information.67 As to whether a First Amendment claim
that a particular record should be deemed constitutionally exempt from the Act would be
successful, the Seventh Circuit stated that such a challenge could be brought only after
persons who want to assert a constitutional right of access to that record make a request
for that record and, if access is denied, sue the custodian who could have disclosed it.68
Conclusion
Prior to the DPPA’s enactment, members of the media were granted access to basic
information, such as names and addresses, contained in motor vehicle records. States would
protect the privacy interests of licensed individuals by redacting sensitive information
from the disclosed files—after balancing those privacy interests against the right of
access to public records. Congress, in enacting the DPPA, rejected such a balancing
approach and effectuated a strict public policy favoring the privacy interests of
individuals over the benefits of public access and the unfettered revenues that heretofore
were available to the states.
By focusing on the states’ involvement in the information marketplace and the
federal government’s ability to regulate such commercial interests, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits ignored the role state public records laws play in the governance of a
state. Every state has a mechanism for protecting the privacy of individuals while
permitting public access to public records. By enacting the DPPA, Congress dictated the
balance of that privacy analysis with regard to motor vehicle records. In doing so,
Congress limited the tools that are available to members of the media seeking sources.
Endnotes
1. The general rule under state public records acts is that government records will be
deemed to be open to the public unless specifically exempted, creating a general
presumption in favor of access. See generally C. Thomas Dienes et al.,
Newsgathering and the Law § 11-1 (1997 & Supp. 1998).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2721-25.
3. Two courts of appeal have found the DPPA to be constitutional. See Oklahoma v.
United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir.
1998). Two courts of appeal have found the DPPA to be unconstitutional and have enjoined
its enforcement. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6,
1999); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W.
3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
4. 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17,
1999) (No. 98-1464). A petition for certiorari has been filed in the case of Oklahoma v.
United States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
5. See United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1978); Washington v.
Harlow, 933 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("There is no need for national
uniformity on use of state drivers’ records.").
6. See, e.g., Robert v. Mississippi Republican Party, 465 So. 2d 1050 (Miss. 1985);
Hanig v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (1992); Ohio ex rel.
Patterson v. Ayers, 171 N.E.2d 508, 509 (Ohio 1960).
7. See, e.g., Direct Mail Ser., Inc. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 5 N.E.2d 545
(Mass. 1937); Robert, 465 So. 2d at 1051 (Miss. 1985); Stewart v. Maybury, 3 P.2d 138, 139
(Wash. 1931).
8. See, e.g., Perkey v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 228 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174
(1986); Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 528 N.E.2d 880, 882 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Dep’t of Highway Safety v. Krejci Co., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1322,
1323 (Fla. Ct. App. 1990) (driver’s license photographic records are exempt from
public inspection).
10. See, e.g., Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 528 N.E.2d 880 (Mass. Ct. App.
1988); Hanig v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 580 N.Y.S.2d 715, 718 (1992).
11. See Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 528 N.E.2d 880, 886 (Mass. Ct. App.
1988).
12. See Cal. Veh. Code § 1808.21. The Commonwealth of Virginia was also prompted
to pass similar legislation. See Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-208.
13. Personal information is defined by the Act as "information that identifies an
individual, including an individual’s photograph, Social Security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and
medical or disability information, but does not include information on vehicular
accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). "Motor vehicle record" is defined by the Act as
"any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator’s permit, motor vehicle
title, motor vehicle registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor
vehicles." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(1).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(11).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(c).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). A civil action against a state or its department of motor
vehicles is not authorized by the Act because its definition of "person"
excludes "a State or agency thereof." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b).
23. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 28.10.505(e); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204(3.5);
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-10; Ind. Code §§ 9-14-3.5-1 to 3.5-15; Iowa Code § 321.11; Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, §§ 255-56, 2102; Md. State Gov’t Code Ann. § 10-616(p);
N.D. Cent. Code §§ 39- 33-05(12); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4501.27; S.C. Code Ann. §
56-3-540; Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-25-101 to -112; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 731.001-009;
W. Va. Code §§ 17A-2A-1 to - 14.
24. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-450; Cal. Veh. Code §§ 1808.21-.47;
Del. Code Ann. tit. 21, § 305; Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-2; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-2012; Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 481.063; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 260:14; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-2-7.1; Okla.
Stat. tit. 51, § 24A.5; Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-208.
25. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-72-204(3.5)(d); Nev. Rev. Stat. §
481.063(5)(h).
26. See, e.g., R.L. Polk and Co. v. Ryan, 694 N.E.2d 1027 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); 21
Ill. Reg. 466 (1997).
27. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1998).
28. See Pryor v. Reno, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. April 6, 1999); Oklahoma v. United
States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464); Travis, 163 F.3d
at 1000.
29. See Pryor, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 (DPPA is unconstitutional); Travis,
163 F.3d at 1000 (DPPA is constitutional); Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1266 (DPPA is
constitutional); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67
U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464) (DPPA is unconstitutional).
30. See Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272. The Seventh Circuit has noted that
driving and the mailing- list business in the aggregate have a substantial effect on
commerce. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1002.
31. No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 1999).
32. Id. at *3.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
37. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
38. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528.
39. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 461-62 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted,
67 U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
40. In the Fourth Circuit, the United States pointed to several statutes that restrict
private parties from disclosing personal information, including the Video Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (restricts disclosure of video rental records), the
Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (restricts disclosure of cable
subscriber records), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1618b (restricts
disclosure of credit reports). Condon, 155 F.3d at 462. In the Seventh Circuit, the
United States pointed to additional federal limitations on the disclosure of information
by banks, telephone companies, hospitals, and universities. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000,
1005 (7th Cir. 1998).
41. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050, at *5 n.7 (11th Cir. Apr. 6,
1999); Condon, 155 F.3d at 462.
42. See Condon, 155 F.3d at 461-62 ("Congress passed the DPPA
specifically to regulate the States’ control of the States’ own
property—the motor vehicle records.") Pryor, 1999 WL 187050 at *5.
43. Condon, 155 F.3d at 462-63.
44. See Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1002-04 (7th Cir. 1998); Oklahoma v. United
States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998). The Seventh and Tenth Circuits relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), in which
the Court upheld the constitutionality of federal legislation that compelled states to
issue bonds in registered form.
45. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
46. 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
47. Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 at *6 (11th Cir. April 6, 1999).
48. Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W.
3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
49. Pryor, 1999 WL 187050 at *4.
50. Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1272. The scope of the federal preemption is seen by the
Tenth Circuit as limited to the dissemination of personal information into the stream of
commerce. "The DPPA neither limits a state’s ability to regulate in the field of
automobile licensing and registration, an exercise traditionally left to the states, nor
restricts a state’s ability to use motor vehicle information in its own regulatory
activities." Id.
51. Id. Accord Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998).
52. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1005 (7th Cir. 1998) ( "[T]he Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act affects states as owners of data, rather than as sovereigns.")
53. Id. at 1003.
54. Id. at 1003-04.
55. Id. at 1004.
56. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
57. See Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453, 464 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67
U.S.L.W. 3588 (U.S. May 17, 1999) (No. 98-1464).
58. See Pryor v. Reno, No. 98-6261, 1999 WL 187050 at *6 n.10 (11th Cir. Apr. 6,
1999); Condon, 155 F.3d at 464 ("right to privacy" limited to matters of
reproduction, contraception, abortion, and marriage). The Tenth Circuit in Oklahoma v.
United States, 161 F.3d 1266, 1273 n.6 (10th Cir. 1998), upheld the validity of the DPPA
against Tenth Amendment attack and, therefore, found it unnecessary to address the United
States’ Fourteenth Amendment argument.
59. Condon, 155 F.3d at 464.
60. Id. at 465 ("We seriously doubt that an individual has a constitutional
right to privacy in information routinely shared with strangers.").
61. Id. at 463 n.6.
62. Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 1998).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1006-07 (7th Cir. 1998) (under § 2725(2) of the Act, "person"
does not include a state or agency thereof).
65. Id. at 1007.
66. Id. at 1000.
67. Id. at 1007 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)) (plurality
opinion).
68. Id.