California Enacts Law to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles

Amy Royden

The Eighth Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP-8) concluded late Nov. 1, 2002, with the issuance of the Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development, a broad political statement on climate change and sustainable development. The parties also reached agreement on other largely technical issues, which are described in more detail below. Finally, parties agreed to consider Italy’s offer to host the next COP (COP-9) Dec. 1-12, 2003. (All the COP decision documents can be accessed at http://unfccc.int/cop8/index.html). While not an official agenda item, Canada and Russia’s prospects for ratifying the Kyoto Protocol – thus enabling the Protocol to enter into force – were also a focus at the meeting.

Ministerial Declaration
The Delhi Declaration echoes themes already contained in the UNFCCC and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and contains no concrete commitments. (See Decision__/CP.8 at http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/1_cpl6rev1.pdf). Of note, it calls on parties that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to strongly urge those that have not ratified to do so; the first draft did not mention the Protocol at all. The European Union (EU) had sought inclusion of language that would address or at least set up a process for discussing commitments beyond the Protocol’s first commitment period, but in the end this was not included. Developing countries criticized the EU’s statement that this process should be conducted with a view to a “more inclusive and long-term global cooperation based on broader and balanced participation,” though the EU later clarified that it was “not talking about imposing emission reduction targets on developing countries.”

Like the documents adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Declaration calls for actions to substantially increase the global share of renewable energy sources, but sets no targets or timetable. The Declaration also echoes concerns repeatedly stated by developing countries: it calls for Annex 1 parties to further implement their commitments under the Convention, states that technology transfer and capacity-building should be strengthened, and notes that developing countries are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and thus adaptation is a high priority.

Reporting Required of Developed Countries on Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol
Parties agreed on the reporting required by developed countries in the Kyoto Protocol to facilitate tracking emission reductions and thus compliance with assigned amount allocations. All Annex 1 countries are required to report electronically each calendar year specified information about emission reduction units (ERUs) (which are generated through joint implementation projects), certified emission reductions (CERs) (which are generated through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)), assigned amount units (AAUs) (which are traded through emission trading), and removal units (RMUs) (which are generated through sinks projects that remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere). In addition, expert review teams will review the information provided by Parties to assess whether the information is complete and is consistent with agreed-upon procedures, and whether the information submitted by Parties is consistent with that contained in its national registry (e.g., if a cancellation is recorded in one place, is it recorded in the other?) The expert review teams also review whether the Party has retained the required commitment period reserve. After its review, the expert review team is required to assess whether aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions for the commitment period exceed the quantities of ERUs, CERs, AAUs, and RMUs in the retirement account of the Party for the commitment period. The parties also agreed to procedures for reviewing Parties’ national registries and to an expedited procedure for review in the case of Parties that seek reinstatement to be eligible to use the flexibility mechanisms (emissions trading, the CDM, and joint implementation). See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/19_sbstal15add1.pdf

Improved Guidelines for National Communications by Developing Countries
Developing countries are required, with financial assistance provided by developed countries, to submit communications detailing their emissions and steps they are taking to meet their UNFCCC commitments. A number of developing countries have yet to submit any communications. Improved guidelines for national communications by developing countries (perhaps remarkably) generated controversy at COP-8. Deliberations on these dragged on through a high-level contact group meeting on the afternoon of Oct. 31, 2002, the penultimate date of the meeting. In a novel procedural move, the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), Raul Estrada, proposed following the contact group meeting that the SBI adopt a draft decision on these guidelines even though the text was not available. The EU and Canada protested, so Estrada postponed consideration until the following day, and a draft decision was adopted on Friday, Nov. 1, 2002. In this decision, the COP decided that developing country parties should use the adopted guidelines for preparation of their second, and, where appropriate, their initial and/or third communications, except if a party is far along in the process of obtaining funding for the second communications based on the old guidelines. For this decision, and the improved guidelines, see http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/2_sbi.pdf

Guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) on Financing
The parties adopted several decisions with respect to the financial mechanism (GEF). Guidance to the GEF with respect to the Special Climate Change Fund (one of the three funds established at COP-7) proved especially controversial. Developing countries expressed their frustration with the slow pace of funding becoming available, as India for G-77/China sought to include language that would operationalize this Fund by COP-9. In the end, parties agreed that, “upon completion” of a process to providing further guidance to the GEF, a decision at COP-9 “will provide guidance to the [GEF] in order for the [GEF] to operationalize the fund without delay thereafter.” See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/10_sbi.pdf. The parties also agreed to further guidance on the Least Developed Countries Fund (another of the three funds established at COP-7). See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/9_sbi.pdf. The draft decision on the review of the financial mechanism (i.e., the GEF), inter alia, requests the GEF to explore opportunities for streamlining its guidance, as well as invites the GEF to review its project cycle with a view to making it simpler and more efficient. See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/8_sbi.pdf In a separate decision, the parties provide guidance to the GEF on matters relating to national communications, capacity-building, technology transfer, and Article 6 of the UNFCCC. See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/11_sbi.pdf

Rules of Procedure for the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
Parties decided several issues with respect to the Executive Board of the CDM. See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/23_cpl5.pdf. Most importantly, the Parties adopted rules of procedure for the Executive Board of the CDM. See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/24_cpl5add1.pdf. These include rules for nomination, election and re-election of members; suspension and resignation; conflicts and confidentiality; election and role of officers; voting rules; and how meetings will be conducted. With regard to the latter, Rule 27 states that meetings of the Executive Board “shall be open to attendance, as observers, by all Parties and by all UNFCCC accredited observers and stakeholders, except where otherwise decided by the Executive Board.” The United States – an observer since it has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol – has insisted that attendance means access to the meeting room, while the Executive Board has not allowed observers into the room but provided access by video. This was addressed in the COP decision with language encouraging the Executive Board to explain, when it reports on its activities, how it was implementing Rule 27. Also of note, the parties agreed to adopt simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM project activities (contained in Document FCCC/CP/2002/3 annex II).

Request for a Special Report on HFCs/PFCs
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs) are in the Kyoto Protocol basket of six greenhouse gases (GHGs), but they are also designated as substitutes for ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) under the Montreal Protocol. Recognizing the importance of protecting the ozone layer, that many developing countries rely on HFCs, and the need to find ODS substitutes that are not GHGs, the Parties invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Montreal Protocol’s Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) to develop a “balanced, scientific, technical and policy-relevant special report.” Furthermore, Parties agreed to drop this subject as a specific agenda item for the Subsidiary Body of Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) since the IPCC and TEAP would now be looking into this matter, until the IPCC and TEAP provided their report. See http://unfccc.int/cop8/latest/15_sbstal19add1.pdf

“Brazil” Proposal
At COP-3, Brazil proposed a formula for allocating responsibility for climate change among developed countries based on historical emissions data. This proposal used a simplified climate model for estimating the temperature increase resulting from emissions from different countries. Since that time, the SBSTA has broadened this analysis to involve a number of research institutions and to create a more complex model that would consider, among other things, radiative forcing, historic path of concentrations, temperature rise and sea level rise. (See document FCCC/SBSTA/2002/INF.14) Two major changes made this analysis less palatable to developing countries. First, rather than just focus on developed countries, emissions from developing countries were also included. Secondly, in assigning attribution (responsibility), some experts proposed using a “start” date of 1950 as opposed to 1890, which would assign more attribution to developing countries. As a result, this proposal has been downgraded to a side event at SBSTA-20 (2004) and a SBSTA review on progress of the work on scientific and methodological aspects of the proposal at SBSTA’s 23rd meeting (2005) (See document FCCC/SBSTA/2002/L.24).

Canada & Russia Ratification
Canada proposed last year that it be allowed to obtain emission credits in the first commitment period for its exports of clean energy (natural gas and hydropower) to the United States. SBSTA deferred discussion of this agenda item until its next meeting. (See document FCCC/SBSTA/2002/L.25) At the time of the meeting, Canada had not yet ratified the Protocol, as some of its provinces (notably large energy exporter Alberta) oppose it, and this proposal for credit seemed geared at appeasing Alberta.

At a side event during the COP, several Russian parliamentarians cast doubt on the prospects of Russian ratification without some form of “compensation.” However, the highest levels of the Russian government have committed to ratifying the Protocol. Some speculate that the conflicting information is due to dissension within the Russian government as to which agency or entity will reap the financial benefits of sales of emission credits; others believe it may be a bid to obtain a better price for these credits by holding up ratification.

Coda
After a disappointing result at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it is not surprising that the Delhi Declaration was not a more momentous statement. At some point parties will need to begin discussing emission reduction targets for the next commitment period (beyond 2012), even if such a process was not spelled out in the Declaration. On a more positive note, COP-8 saw progress on several important technical issues, such as rules of procedure for the Executive Board of the CDM, improved guidelines for national communications from developing countries, and reporting requirements for developed countries.

Amy Royden is a senior staff associate at the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators (STAPPA) and the Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials (ALAPCO). She is also the co-editor of the Section’s Climate Change and Sustainable Development Committee Newsletter.