Rent a Car, Rent a Spy
Governments react to new uses for GPS
By Elizabeth C. Yen
It started with a bit of new technology. It ended with
at least a few legislatures coming down really hard. So
much for unbridled innovation in the
marketplace.
Global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices have
been available for several years in motor vehicles, for
the primary purpose of offering drivers navigational
assistance. However, these devices also enable third
parties (including law enforcement and car rental
companies) to see where and at what speeds a vehicle has
been driven. In Connecticut and California, two locally
owned and operated car rental companies were recently
required to discontinue using GPS information as a means
of enforcing speeding and mileage surcharge provisions
in their rental contracts.
Several states (including New York, Connecticut and
California) have also enacted legislation restricting
the car rental industry's ability to use GPS
information. The innovative business practices of a very
small number of companies have apparently caused
industry-wide legislative repercussions.
Recent Connecticut litigation involved a car rental
company's use of GPS information to determine the number
of times a customer had exceeded 79 miles an hour for
two or more continuous minutes. The contract included a
provision allowing the rental company to impose a
speeding surcharge of $150 for each speeding episode
lasting two or more minutes. These surcharges typically
appeared on a customer's credit or debit card statement
several weeks after the rental vehicle had been
returned.
Some customers did not receive advance notice of these
surcharges, and therefore unwittingly exceeded their
credit limits or overdrew their deposit accounts. (See
American Car Rental v. Commissioner of Consumer
Protection, 273 Conn. 296, 2005 WL 756772 (Conn.,
April 12, 2005). See also Turner v. American Car
Rental, 2004 WL 1888947 (Superior Court 2004), where
the jury awarded the plaintiff the $450 that had been
charged to his credit card for three separate instances
of speeding during the course of a short-term car
rental, plus court costs and $6,000 in attorneys'
fees.)
In an administrative proceeding initiated by the
Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection against
the car rental company, the company argued that the $150
charge was reasonable liquidated damages for the
additional wear and tear caused to its vehicles by
customers who engaged in unlawful speeding. However, an
administrative hearing officer determined, based on the
testimony of various expert witnesses, that the excess
wear and tear associated with driving one of the rental
car company's cars at 80 miles per hour for two
continuous minutes was closer to 37 cents.
Following the rental car company's unsuccessful appeal
from the administrative proceeding to a Connecticut
trial court, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently
affirmed that the $150 charge was an unenforceable
penalty, unsupported by evidence of commensurate vehicle
wear and tear, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act.
The court held that, even if use of GPS information to
enforce the speeding surcharge provision of the rental
contract was clearly disclosed in advance to a renter,
the rental company could not surcharge its customer $150
for two-minute-long episodes of speeding, since the
company failed to present evidence showing a reasonable
relationship between the $150 surcharge and the
increased depreciation, wear and tear suffered by a
vehicle because of speeding.
The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that a renter who
maintained a speed of 80 miles an hour for 30 continuous
minutes would be charged $150 according to the terms of
the rental contract. A renter who maintained a speed of
80 miles an hour for only two minutes would also be
charged $150, indicating that the $150 surcharge did not
reasonably correlate to vehicle wear and tear. In
addition, a renter who maintained a speed of 80 miles an
hour for 15 continuous minutes, and then decelerated to
75 miles per hour for five minutes, followed by an
acceleration to 85 miles an hour for 10 continuous
minutes, would be charged $300 for two episodes of
speeding.
The court observed that, based on the administrative
hearing officer's factual determinations, "a
customer would have to travel more than 1,070 miles at
high speeds, without decelerating below 80 miles per
hour, to cause $150 of excess wear on the vehicle.
Presumably, the customer would have to stop to refuel
several times, especially if driving at high speeds, to
travel that distance. Each time the customer decelerated
below 80 miles per hour, as would be required to refuel,
the subsequent acceleration above 79 miles per hour
would trigger another 'occurrence' and another speeding
fee. Thus, the rental vehicle could never suffer enough
additional wear due solely to high speed driving to
qualify the plaintiff's speeding fee as a liquidated
damages charge."
The California attorney general also recently took
administrative action against a leasing company that
used GPS information to surcharge its customers. (See a
California attorney general press release of Nov. 9,
2004, regarding settlement in the matter of State of
California v. Acceleron Corp. et al., copies
available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/ newsalerts/2004/04-
129.htm and http://www.ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/2004/04-
129_settle.pdf.)
The California rental company's contract disclosed the
fact that a higher mileage charge would apply if the car
were driven out of state, but apparently did not
disclose that GPS information would be used to determine
whether the car had been driven out of state. In
addition, the car rental company apparently advertised
unlimited mileage (no per-mile charges), without clearly
disclosing the geographic limitations associated with
the unlimited mileage feature.
Due in part to the practices of these two leasing
companies, the California and Connecticut legislatures
enacted laws restricting the ability of leasing
companies to use GPS information. In California, car
rental companies may no longer use GPS information to
impose surcharges, fines or penalties relating to the
renter's use of a leased vehicle. (See California Civil
Code Section 1936(o).) GPS information may be used by a
California rental company to help locate a stolen,
abandoned or missing vehicle, provided that this is
clearly and conspicuously disclosed in advance to the
customer.
The California attorney general's recent administrative
settlement with Acceleron Corp. goes a step further,
requiring this disclosure to be included in ads, during
the reservation process, and at the rental counter, and
by requiring the rental company to make vehicles
available to renters, on request, that do not contain
functioning GPS or other electronic surveillance
devices.
GPS information also may be used by a California car
rental company "for the sole purpose of determining
the date and time the vehicle is returned to the rental
company, and the total mileage driven and the vehicle
fuel level of the returned vehicle," provided that
the technology is used for such purposes "only
after the renter has returned the vehicle to the rental
company."
California Civil Code Section 1936(o) also allows a
rental vehicle to include "GPS based technology
that provides navigation assistance to the occupants of
the rental vehicle," provided that "the rental
company does not use, access or obtain any information
relating to the renter's use of the rental vehicle that
was obtained using that technology, except for the
purposes of discovering or repairing a defect in the
technology and the information may then be used only for
that purpose."
In addition, a rental vehicle may include electronic
surveillance technology for remote locking or unlocking
of the vehicle at the request of the renter, or for
vehicle roadside assistance at the request of the
renter, provided the car rental company only uses this
technology for such purposes. GPS information may also
be disclosed by a California car rental company to law
enforcement "pursuant to a subpoena or search
warrant."
New York similarly prohibits short-term car rental
companies from using GPS information "to determine
or impose any costs, fees, charges or penalties on an
authorized driver for such driver's use of a rental
vehicle," subject to an exception for the recovery
of "a vehicle that is lost, misplaced or
stolen." (See McKinney's General Business Law
Section 396-z, Subsection 13-a.) Other states (such as
Massachusetts) are contemplating similar legislation.
All of this serves as a useful reminder that, although a
business may use entirely legal and commonly available
technology, together with full contractual disclosure,
that may not be enough to insulate the business from
administrative, legislative or legal action,
particularly if the business' practice is perceived to
be overreaching, unfair or deceptive. A business may
operate entirely within the four corners of the letter
of the law, but if it does not exercise sufficient self-
restraint, disgruntled consumers may demand a
governmental response that industry will have difficulty
counteracting.
Connecticut's legislative response to press reports
about the use of GPS and similar devices in vehicles,
both within and outside of Connecticut, was particularly
harsh. Connecticut enacted nonuniform provisions
concerning the use of GPS, remote ignition
"kill" and other "electronic self-
help" devices by both secured creditors and
lessors, as part of the state's versions of UCC Articles
9 and 2A.
Connecticut's version of UCC Section 9-609 prohibits
"the use of electronic means to locate the
collateral" or to "render equipment
unusable" unless (a) "the debtor separately
agrees to a term of the security agreement authorizing
electronic self-help that requires [advance] notice of
exercise" and (b) the secured party gives the
debtor at least 15 days' advance written notice of its
intent to use electronic self-help. In addition,
"electronic self-help may not be used if the
secured party has reason to know that its use will
result in substantial injury or harm to the public
health or safety or grave harm to the public interest
substantially affecting third parties not involved in
the dispute." (See Conn. Gen. Stat. Section 42a-9-
609(d).)
Comparable provisions appear in Connecticut's nonuniform
version of UCC Article 2A, Section 2A-702, applicable to
both short-term and long-term consumer and commercial
leases of personal property, and in Connecticut's
nonuniform version of the Uniform Consumer Leases Act.
(See Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 42a-2A-702(e) and 42-
419(d).)
In contrast to GPS devices, remote ignition
"kill" devices allow a rental company or other
third party to effectively render the vehicle
nonfunctional, posing potential public safety concerns
and also implicating self-help repossession statutes.
(See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Sections 42a-2A-
717(a) and 42a-9-609(a)(2).)
GPS devices do not appear to present the same public
safety or repossession-related questions as ignition
"kill" devices, but were nonetheless lumped
together with ignition "kill" devices in
behind-the-scenes Connecticut legislative drafting
discussions that culminated in the state's current
statutory restrictions on the use of "electronic
self-help" to locate or repossess collateral, or to
make collateral unusable.
The legislative response in Connecticut to the use of
GPS tracking devices by a very small number of players
in the relevant marketplace was arguably unnecessarily
broad in scope, by applying to both long-term and short-
term vehicle leases, as well as the use of GPS tracking
devices in vehicles by secured parties, without any
exception for large-dollar or commercial-purpose
transactions. Long-term commercial leasing and finance
companies that did not contribute to the GPS-related
concerns recently addressed by the Connecticut Supreme
Court may now be effectively precluded from using GPS or
similar electronic technology to locate their leased or
financed personal property post-default.
The California, New York and Connecticut legislative
responses to the use of GPS devices in rental vehicles
provide cautionary examples of governmental responses to
the use of technology for purposes not originally
intended nor anticipated by manufacturers.
State and federal "do not call" and "do
not fax" restrictions are additional recent
examples of governmental responses to widespread
business use of legal, readily available, inexpensive
technology for legitimate marketing purposes that
evolved with inadequate industry self-regulation and
insufficient industry attention to consumer privacy
concerns.
Once a consumer protection matter becomes the subject of
legislative or regulatory scrutiny, it may be too late
for an industry to use "best practices" or
other forms of self-regulation as an effective way of
minimizing government intervention.
Yen is a partner in the Connecticut office of Hudson
Cook, LLP, headquartered in Maryland. She is a past
chair of the Truth in Lending Subcommittee of the
Consumer Financial Services Committee of the ABA Section
of Business Law. The views expressed in this article are
personal and not necessarily those of any employer,
client, constituent or affiliate of the author. Yen is
admitted to practice in Connecticut only. Her e-mail is
ecyen@hudco.com.
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