ࡱ> 98( / 0LDTimes New RomanttO 0@ .  @n?" dd@  @@`` p4 ,    0AA@uʚ;2Nʚ;g4TdTdO 0ppp@ <4!d!d@w 0tO<4dddd@w 0tO <4BdBd@x 0tA9___PPT10 6? %The EU Microsoft DecisionAryeh Friedman AT&T Corp Article 82 Hoffman-La Roche, Case 85/76,[1979] E.C.R. 91: Defined abusive exploitation of a dominant position as  recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition. :e"  Background$Monopoly Leveraging/Duty to Disclose%%(4Leveraging from the PC client operating system market to the work group server operating system market. Does network effects make leveraging argument more compelling? Leveraging by withholding technical information on interoperability from server competitors. Affects client/server inter-operability and server/server interoperability. Commission stated that this conduct  has enabled Microsoft to acquire a dominant position in the market for work group server operating systems. Servers as future competitive platform to OS platform?Z1E.U. v. U.S. Law: Leveraging and Duty to DiscloseTetra Pak (II) monopoly leveraging by, inter alia, non-disclosure of specifications needed for interoperability an abuse of dominance under Article 82.> f $Trinko and scope of right of refusal to deal. U.S. v. Microsoft: MS s version of Java, even though developed to be incompatible with rivals, not a violation. 253 F.3d at 75. FTC consent decree with Intel  Intel not to w/hold info to companies seeking to protect IP rights.8Z(Bundling of WMP and O/SIllegal bundling of the Windows Media Player (for streaming media) with the client O/S system. Note RealNetworks current antitrust suit against Microsoft. Effects: Significantly weakened competition in the media player market (but no claim of dominance in that market):  artificially reduces the incentives of & content providers to develop their offerings to competing media players.  Tipping  would allow Microsoft to control related markets in the digital media sector. Z E.U. v. U.S. Law: Bundling/TyingQ s and A s cited Tetra Pak (contractual tying of non-aseptic machines and cartons held illegal as abuse of its dominant position) and Hilti (nail guns, cartridge strips and nails). Applied rule of reason.0ZlB U.S. v. Microsoft: Tying browser to operating system Technological v. contractual integration Remanded under rule of reason. Court of Appeals noted failure to define browser market or show a dangerous probability of monopolizing that market."Z RemediesrFines: Commission can impose fines from 1K to 1M, but not exceeding 10% turnover in the preceding year; fine here was 497.2 ($613 million) Interoperability: W/in 120 days, MS must disclose interface documentation which would allow non-MS servers to interoperate with MS client OS and servers, subject to reasonable remuneration (supervised by Trustee). Tying: W/in 90 days. MS must offer to PC manufacturers client O/S system w/out WMP$Z(" E.U. v. U.S. Law: RemedieszRegulation 17, art. 3: Conduct (no structural) remedies and fines Compulsory licensing. Magill, but see, NDC Health v. IMS${X" U.S. v. Microsoft: Lower court proposed structural (note court of appeals concerns) and conduct remedies U.S. settlement allows WMP to be hidden but not removed (Were the remedies in the consent decree effective?)   0` ` ̙33` 333MMM` ff3333f` f` f` 3>?" dd@,|?" dd@   " @ ` n?" dd@   @@``PR    @ ` ` p>> f(    6]O P O T Click to edit Master title style! !  0ZO  O RClick to edit Master text styles Second level Third level Fourth level Fifth level!     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AT&T Corpe.-՜.+,D՜.+,    HOn-screen ShowAT&T>+   Times New RomanDefault DesignThe EU Microsoft Decision Article 82 Background%Monopoly Leveraging/Duty to Disclose2E.U. v. U.S. Law: Leveraging and Duty to DiscloseBundling of WMP and O/S!E.U. v. U.S. Law: Bundling/Tying RemediesE.U. v. U.S. Law: Remedies  Fonts UsedDesign Template Slide Titles 8@,_AdHocReviewCycleID_EmailSubject _AuthorEmail_AuthorEmailDisplayName_ReviewingToolsShownOncec  Section 2achavez@univation.comChavez, Anthony J._>0PetersDPetersD !"#$%&')*+,-./1234567:Root EntrydO)Current User0SummaryInformation( PowerPoint Document(>DocumentSummaryInformation8(