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Recent Articles of Interest
Articles
Botein, Judicial Review of FCC Action, 13 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L. J. 317 (1995). With the advent of the so-called
"information superhighway" and possible substantive
amendments to the Communications Act, and because the Federal Communications
Commission has faced relatively few changes in its enabling statute
during the last sixty years, some have suggested that the time may
be ripe to refine and rationalize the FCC's appellate procedure.
Professor Botein suggests that judicial review of FCC action is
a bit more complex than that of other regulatory agencies, the
greatest difficulty being getting into an appellate court in the
first place. First, the dividing line between "appeals"
of licensing decisions and "petitions for review" of
other actions sometimes is less than clear. Second, it is sometimes
difficult to identify the proper document on which to base judicial
review, and thus the appropriate timing of review. While conceding
that the FCC's present system does have some flaws and inconsistencies,
Professor Botein concludes that it may make sense to leave it unchanged
until the form of substantive developments in emerging communications
solidifies. At this relatively early point, no major changes appear
to be necessary.
Dauber, The Ties That Do Not Bind: Nonbinding Arbitration
In Federal Administrative Agencies, 9 Admin. L. J. Am.
u. 165 (1995). Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a term that
describes cooperative problem solving methods, such as arbitration.
Recognizing the need for ADR within the federal agencies, Congress
enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act. The ADR Act
authorizes and encourages administrative agencies to implement
ADR techniques voluntarily, rather than pursue traditional litigation
to solve conflicts. This comment focuses primarily on the use of
arbitration provisions in the ADR Act. Certain of these provisions
permit the agency to arbitrate as long as the agency head may
either terminate an arbitration proceeding or vacate an arbitration
award within thirty days of the decision. Consequently, a participant
in an agency arbitration unexpectedly may find herself without
the arbitrator's award if the agency head chooses to vacate the
decision. The effect of these provisions is, in the authors opinion,
not unlike standing over a trap door that appears to be on solid
ground, but may disappear at any moment. Ms. Dauber argues that
these provisions raise concerns about due process, the absence
of legal precedent, the power of the arbitrator or"neutral,"
judicial review, and policy considerations. While Ms. Dauber believes
that the ADR Act has put federal administrative agencies on the
path to a more efficient method of dispute resolution, she concludes
that Congress should do more to compel ADR programs in federal agencies.
Fitzpatrick, The Choice Between Adjudication And Rulemaking
For Developing Administrative Policy In Pennsylvania, 4
Widener J. Pub. l. 373 (1995). Although the federal law is clear
that an agency's choice to develop policy via rulemaking or adjudication
will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion, state law on
this issue is less clear. Two of the most vexing questions of administrative
law in Pennsylvania are these: When may an agency establish new
policies via adjudication, and when, if ever, may a reviewing
court compel the agency to use rulemaking instead of adjudication
to establish such policies? In this article, Mr. Fitzpatrick reviews
federal and Pennsylvania law on this issue. After reviewing the
case law, the author examines balancing factors used in the abuse
of discretion test and suggests an approach for Pennsylvania courts
to take when confronting these questions.
Lee, Twentyfive Years After Goldberg v. Kelly: Traveling
From The Right Spot On TheWrong Road To The Wrong Place,
23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 863 (1995). In this article, Professor Lee examines
the procedural due process "revolution" that developed
in the 1970's beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The article addresses the state
of procedural due process before the revolution, and considers
how Goldberg began that revolution. Professor Lee also looks at
the cases following Goldberg: first, those that took advantage
of the new freedom Goldberg had set in motion; second, those that
sought to settle on a final test; and third, those that signaled
what that test might become. In the end, the Supreme Court settled
on a balancing test for procedural due process analysis that,
as the author contends, was probably neither the best nor the worst
of the tests considered. Yet, Professor Lee concludes, what matters
is not the answer reached but the commitment to finding the right answer.
Martin, Preclusive Effect Of Factual Determinations Of The
International Trade Commission With Regard To Patent Matters,
62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 885 (1995). One of the powers Congress granted
to the International Trade Commission was authority to block the
importation of products that infringe on valid United States patents.
This power often requires the ITC to determine whether the patent
itself is valid. However, Congress also granted federal district courts
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under the
United States patent laws. Therefore, there are two forums that
may determine patent validity, raising the question of whether
one forum's determination will have a preclusive effect over the
other. For a court to grant preclusive effect to an administrative
agency's decisions, the agency must follow procedures that are
sufficiently similar to those of traditional judicial bodies.
In this article, Mr. Martin asserts that while Congress intended
to deny preclusive effect to legal determinations of the ITC involving
patent issues, it did not intend to deny preclusive effect to
factual determinations of the ITC involving these issues. Because
the ITC follows procedures that are substantially similar to those
of district courts, Mr. Martin concludes, those courts should
grant preclusive effect to the factual determinations of the ITC
with regard to patent matters.
Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the
Regulatory Process, 74 N.C.L. Rev.1 (1995). In this article,
Professor Noah examines the problem of "sham petitioning,"
the improper use of administrative procedures by firms in various
industries seeking to delay or prevent entry into the market by
would-be competitors. Noting that the Federal Trade Commission is
investigating this problem, the author argues that a strategy
relying upon federal antitrust laws is ineffective in the face
of the broad constitutional right to petition invoked by firms
making manipulative regulatory submissions. Instead, the author
proposes modifications of agency procedures to effect direct curtailment
of unfair delaying tactics. Professor Noah concludes that only
when agencies take greater responsibility for controlling abuses
of administrative proceedings will incumbent firms be stymied in
their efforts to misuse administrative processes to inhibit lawful
market entry by their rivals.
O'Reilly & Berg, Stealth Caused by Sunshine: How Sunshine
Act Interpretation Results in Less Information for the Public About
the Decisionmaking Process of the International Trade Commission,
36 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 425 (1995). The Government in the Sunshine
Act is designed to compel federal multi-member agencies to open
for public observation almost all discussion of agency business
conducted by a quorum of the agency, subject to certain exemptions.
Historically, the International Trade Commission (ITC) has interpreted
the Sunshine Act as forbidding its six commissioners from collectively
deliberating in private. In this article, the authors analyze the
applicability of the Sunshine Act's Exemption 10, the exemption
for an agency's initiation, conduct, and disposition of adjudications,
to ITC intellectual property, antidumping, and countervailing duty
investigations and conclude that the exemption properly does apply
to the ITC. The article also sets out other options that, the authors
believe, would allow the ITC to deliberate in closed session.
Schotland, ReExamining the Freedom of Information Act's
Exemption 8: Does it Give an Unduly "Full Service" Exemption
for Bank Examination Reports and Related Material?, 9 Adman.
L. J. Am. U. 43 (1995). The Freedom of Information Act's Exemption
8 provides that FOIA disclosure provisions "do not apply to
matters that are. . . contained in or related to examination, operating,
or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use
of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions." Since the recent costly problems with many
savings and loans and banks, it has been argued that the public interest
requires fuller disclosure of examination report information both
to provide the public with more complete information about problem
situations and to increase the accountability of banking regulators.
Despite these arguments, Professor Schotland's answer to the question
he poses in the title is "No." Professor Schotland concludes
that given all the information publicly available on banks and
on their regulation, and given the detailed quality of exam reports
and similar information, there is neither the need for a FOIA free
of Exemption 8 to enhance accountability nor a likelihood that
repeal would enhance credibility. In fact, Professor Schotland
argues that amendments to Exemption 8 would likely bring about
undesired problems. Assuming that Exemption 8 is not amended,
Professor Schotland offers some suggestions for improving the functioning
of the exemption, such as avoiding broad applications of the exemption,
experimentation with non-FOIA disclosure of information covered
by Exemption 8, and the creation of an interagency multimember
appeals panel for FOIA requests denied on the basis of Exemption
8.
Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information
and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 Iowa
L. Rev. 553 (1995). This article by Professor Paul Schwartz discusses
the theory and practice of data protection in the United States
compared to in Europe. In assessing the theory behind data protection,
Professor Schwartz urges a shift in the paradigm from "the
right to be left alone" to a "privacy as participation"
model. This model "uses the law to create a structure within
which personal data may be utilized while an individual's capacity
for decisionmaking is respected." Decisionmaking encompasses
both deliberative autonomy and deliberative democracy. Professor
Schwartz outlines a legal structure to further this model and finds
that European law suggests acceptance of this model. Examining
American law, however, he finds that while it recognizes the value
of privacy as participation, it does not reflect that paradigm
in a coherent and comprehensive manner. This difference he attributes
to the considerable defensiveness, if not hostility, that Americans
exhibit toward state activism and administrative regulation.
Shapiro & Levy, Judicial Incentives And Indeterminacy
In Substantive Review Of administrative Decisions, 44 Duke
L. J. 1051 (1995). In an effort to explain why two landmark Supreme
Court decisions, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Motor Vehicles
Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29(1983),
have failed as controlling standards, Professors Shapiro and Levy
analyze the impact of judicial incentives on substantive review
in administrative law. To account for this breakdown, Professors
Shapiro and Levy offer a model of judicial behavior based on the
"craft" and"outcome" components of judicial
decisionmaking. By "craft" the authors mean the well reasoned
application of doctrine to the circumstances of a particular case.
"Craft" reflects the values of consistency with constitutional
and statutory provisions and continuity with prior case law. "Outcome,"
on the other hand, focuses on the result in a given case and its implications
for the parties and society as a whole, reflecting the values
of justice and social utility as filtered through the judge's individual
world view. Outcome orientation and craft norms may be consistent
or inconsistent. If they are consistent, judges will decide cases
in accordance with their preferred outcome. This orientation permits
judges to maximize their ideological utility without sacrificing
the respect that comes from following craft. If, however, craft
and outcome are inconsistent, judges will tend to follow a craft
orientation. Judges do so to avoid the loss of respect among fellow
jurists, lawyers, and the public that comes from pursuing an outcome
orientation that is inconsistent with craft. In light of these
relationships, Shapiro and Levy propose that judges favor indeterminate
craft norms in administrative law for two reasons. First, the
utility of being outcome oriented is greater than in other legal
areas. Second, there is less loss of respect from being outcome
oriented if indeterminate craft norms are maintained. As a solution,
Professors Shapiro and Levy recommend that Congress require courts
to respond to a single, comprehensive series of specific questions
that would address what the authors see as the two main sources
of indeterminacy in current substantive review doctrine: vague
scope of review standards and reliance on manipulable categories
to define the appropriate scope of review. Professors Shapiro and
Levy conclude that if Congress adopts more determinate standards,
outcome oriented behavior by judges should decrease.
Steele, The Effect Of The Utah Administrative Procedures
Act On The Standards Of Review For Final Administrative Agency
Adjudications, 9 B.Y.U. J. Pub. L. 389 (1994). Perhaps
the most difficult problem in administrative law is determining
the amount of deference that courts should accord final administrative
agency decisions. In this comment, Mr. Steele examines how the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) addresses this problem.
The comment looks at the standards of review used by the Utah courts
before UAPA was enacted, how those court shave articulated the
standards of review under UAPA, and the amount of deference Utah
courts accord formal agency adjudications. Specifically, the UAPA
replaced the court's standard of reviewing findings of fact and
altered the way in which appellate courts determine the scope
of agency action entitled to intermediate deference (as with mixed
questions of law and fact. The overall effect, Mr. Steele concludes,
will be a decrease in the amount of deference courts accord agency
action.
Wolff, The Federal Advisory Committee Act And The Executive
Privilege: Resolving The Separation Of Powers Issue, 5
Const. L. J. 1023 (1995). Courts and scholars have recognized that
the President has a legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality
of certain information obtained from aides, advisors, and advisory
committees. Though not expressly granted in the United States Constitution,
this executive privilege to receive confidential communications
achieved a constitutional basis as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).
In 1972, however, Congress enacted the Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) to control the establishment and use of public advisory committees.
FACA imposes public "oversight" of the use of advisory
committees by requiring open meetings and public access to documents
used in these meetings. In this article, Ms. Wolff suggests that,
in regulating presidential advisory committees, FACA may encroach
on the President's privilege of confidentiality. Specifically,
Ms. Wolff argues that because FACA has the effect of inhibiting
the President's ability to organize and obtain advice from his
advisors, application of FACA to advisory committees that formulate
and present advice and recommendations to the President when he
is exercising a constitutional function is a violation of the separation
of powers. The solution, in her opinion, is to amend FACA to include
an exemption from FACA's openness and document disclosure requirements
for advisory committees that formulate policy or present advice
to the President. This exemption would be limited to those situations
in which the President consults a committee in furtherance of
his constitutionally assigned functions.
Book Reviews
Croley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 Mich.
L. Rev. 1511 (1995). In this article, Professor Croley reviews
Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy, by
Cornelius M. Kerwin. Professor Croley finds Rulemaking not only
a helpful introduction tothe "hows" and "whys"
of rulemaking, but also a significant contribution to the scholarly literature
on the subject. Perhaps more importantly, Professor Croley suggests,
Kerwin stresses a need for legal scholars to compliment their understanding
of rulemaking by integrating the social scientists' methodological
tools in the pursuit of better understanding how rulemaking works
and how it might be made to work better. It is this "happy
marriage" of law and social science that the reviewer believes
reveals something about what the most fruitful future work in
the field might look like.
Funk, Beyond Casebooks, Beyond Treatises: Administrative
Law Readers, 9 Ad. L. J. Am. Univ. 361 (1995). Professor
Funk reviews Administrative Law Anthology and Foundations of Administrative
Law, two administrative law "readers," collections of
law review articles and book selections, one by Professor Thomas
Sargentich and one by Professor Peter Schuck. Professor Funk notes
that while both would appear to cover the same ground, of the
95 articles in the two books, only five appear in both. This he
explains in part by their difference in purpose and approach, with
Schuck eschewing doctrinal writings in favor of contextual writings
those that explain the context of administrative law rather than
the "law" itself. Professor Sargentich's selections,
on the other hand, address current issues in administrative law,
many of which are doctrinal in nature.
Collections
15 J. Nat. Assoc. Admin. Law Judges (Fall 1995). This issue
provides information on how states with central hearing agencies
function. The lead article by Julian Mann, III, focuses on how
administrative adjudication can follow the principles and practices
that have proven so effective in court management. ALJ Christine
McKenna Moore's speech on the "Evidence for Administrative
Law Judges" follows, demonstrating how important it is for
Administrative Law Judges to understand not only the Rules of Evidence
but the principles behind those rules. The next article is taken
from another speech, this one by ALJ Charles Bono. Judge Bono
explores the history of the evolution of the role of administrative
law judges, giving his "insiders" view of the various
developments over the years. The final article is the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law Judges adopted
unanimously by the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges
of the Judicial Administration Division of the American Bar Association.
Survey
LeDuc, Michigan Administrative Law: Abridged Edition, A
Michigan Administrative Law Primer, 12 T.M. Cooley L. Rev.
21 (1995). Professor LeDuc offers a primer that summarizes the
principles and emphasizes the major aspects of Michigan administrative
law. As an abridged version, this primer does not provide in-depth
analysis of the topics or cases, but rather attempts to summarize
critical administrative law concepts, such as Rules and Rulemaking,
Informal and Formal Adjudication, and Scope and Methods of Judicial
Review of Agency Action.
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ABA and Section Membership information
For additional information on the Section, please contact Leanne Pfautz at:
Phone: (202) 662-1665
Fax: (202) 662-1629
ABA Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice,
10th Floor, 740 15th Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-1009
E-Mail: adminlaw@abanet.org
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